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MOVING FORWARD BY LOOKING BACK: THE
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF OBERGEFELL
LEE-FORD TRITT*
The recent Supreme Court decision of Obergefell v. Hodges has forever altered
American jurisprudence. Not only did this decision make same-sex marriage legal in all
fifty states, but it also required states to recognize same-sex marriages from other states
in accordance with the 14th Amendment. The Court’s holding in Obergefell raises a
fundamental question with serious legal and financial significance: when exactly do
these once unrecognized marriages legally begin? And to what extent must courts apply
Obergefell retroactively? The stakes are high and substantive financial effects are
pending on the answer to this question—for, with marriage, comes wide-ranging rights
and obligations. The decision will predominately impact the realm of real property law,
property succession law, employment benefits, and family law. There currently are,
and will continue to be, complicated lawsuits concerning the potential retroactive
vestment of marital property rights for same-sex married couples, which may also
impact third parties such as purchasers, mortgagees, and title insurers. Unfortunately,
the Obergefell decision provided no guidance on its retroactive application. Therefore,
this Article articulates and defends a rich positive and normative jurisprudential
framework through which to analyze the rapidly growing number of real property,
trusts and estates, and employment benefits disputes that continue to be initiated in the
wake of the Obergefell decision. More importantly, this Article will proffer specific,
effective, and tailored remedies to resolve subtle, but important, variances in these
rapidly growing number of disputes. This Article is the first to examine the retroactivity
of Obergefell as it applies to trusts and estates and property issues.
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INTRODUCTION
When does a same-sex marriage begin?1 In Obergefell v. Hodges,2
the United States Supreme Court held that state laws “exclud[ing]
same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions
as opposite-sex couples” were unconstitutional. 3 The Court’s decision
brought welcome clarity to a heavily debated question that has divided
the nation for the better part of three decades. Following the Court’s

1.
The author has spoken about this question on many occasions since 2014.
See Lee-ford Tritt, Professor of Law, Univ. of Fla. Coll. of Law, Address at the 48th
Annual Philip E. Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning: Because it Wasn’t
Complicated Enough—Estate Planning Issues for Same-Sex Couples in the Wake of the
Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions (January 2014); see also Lee-ford Tritt & Patrick J.
Duffey, Windsor’s Wake: Non-Traditional Estate Planning Issues for Non-Traditional
Families, 48 HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶¶ 1100, 1101.2 (2014).
2.
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Obergefell was a consolidation of six cases from
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee involving fourteen same-sex couples and
two widowers from same-sex marriages who were either denied marriage licenses or
recognition of their out-of-state marriages. Id. at 2593.
3.
Id. at 2604–05.
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holding, same-sex marriage became legal in every state. Amidst the
celebration and criticism that followed Obergefell, though, the Court’s
answer to a second question went largely unnoticed. Obergefell’s
second question—“whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State
to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State
which does grant that right”4—was also conclusively answered in the
affirmative. 5 While there has been extensive and rigorous dialogue
debating the doctrinal reasoning, jurisprudential soundness, and
practical implications of Obergefell’s first question, Obergefell’s second
question has been overwhelmingly ignored. Yet, the Court’s holding
raises a fundamental question with serious legal and financial
significance: when exactly do these once unrecognized, but lawfully
licensed, marriages legally begin?
The answer to that question has implications beyond mere
academic inquiry, regardless of whether these marriages begin on the
date of the Obergefell decision, retroactively on the date of the
marriage ceremonies, or on prospective dates selected by state
legislative bodies. The stakes are high and substantive financial effects
hinge upon the answer to this question—for, with marriage, comes
wide-ranging rights and obligations. Moreover, the practical relevance
of many of these marital rights and obligations are inescapably
intertwined with the length of the marriage. The effects of Obergefell’s
second question will cascade into virtually every legal venue, from tax
to contracts, from bankruptcy to divorce, and from parentage issues to
spousal immunity concerns in criminal law. Though far-reaching, the
decision will predominately impact the realm of state property
laws—particularly real property and property succession. 6 There
currently are, and will continue to be, complicated lawsuits concerning
the potential retroactive vestment of marital property rights for samesex married couples, which may also impact third parties such as
purchasers, mortgagees, and title insurers. Unfortunately, the
Obergefell decision provided no guidance on its retroactive application.
In an effort to fill that jurisprudential chasm, this Article articulates and
defends a rich positive and normative jurisprudential framework
through which courts and legislatures might analyze the rapidly
4.
Id. at 2593.
5.
Id. at 2607–08 (holding that “there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse
to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its
same-sex character”).
6.
There will be serious implications concerning parentage issues as well.
For purposes of this Article, though, parentage issues will be limited to their impact on
property law. Accordingly, the family law implications will be outside the scope of this
Article. For a discussion concerning Obergefell and its implications in the realm of real
estate, see Andrea B. Carroll & Christopher K. Odinet, Gay Marriage and the Problem
of Property, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 847 (2016).
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growing number of real property and property succession disputes that
continue to be initiated in the wake of the Obergefell decision. More
importantly, this Article proffers specific, effective, and tailored
remedies to resolve subtle, but important, variances in the rapidly
growing number of disputes.
A concrete example is a helpful tool to grasp the abstract
intricacies of this subject in a meaningful way. 7 Towards that end,
consider Louise and Thelma,8 who have been in a committed same-sex
relationship since the early nineties. In 1998, they had a commitment
ceremony celebrating their relationship and thereafter registered as
domestic partners under the applicable state law. They were both
domiciled in Massachusetts in 2004 at the time of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.9
Shortly after the Goodridge decision, Louise and Thelma got married.
The following year, they had a child whom they named “John David”
or “J.D.” for short. J.D. was conceived using artificial reproductive
technology and Louise was artificially inseminated using donor sperm.
Thelma did not adopt J.D., and instead relied on the marital
presumption for parentage purposes.10 In 2010, Thelma accepted a job
in Texas and moved there with Louise and J.D. At the time, Texas was
a non-recognition state 11 and a community property state. 12 In 2014,
Thelma was killed by a drunk driver and died without a will. She was
survived by her mother, Louise, and J.D. Probate began on Thelma’s
estate along with a wrongful death lawsuit against the drunk driver.
Thelma’s mother claimed to be Thelma’s sole heir, 13 but Louise and
J.D. also claimed to be Thelma’s heirs. After Thelma’s death,
Obergefell held laws prohibiting the recognition of lawful same-sex
7.
See generally Tritt & Duffey, supra note 1, ¶ 1101.2.
8.
Louise is pretty tired of her name always coming second.
9.
798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that “barring an individual
from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution”).
10.
Under American common law, a child born during a marriage is
presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H.
SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 110 (9th ed. 2013).
11.
A somewhat idiosyncratic vocabulary was adopted to describe the various
state laws that concerned same-sex marriages. The terms “recognition state” and “nonrecognition state” describe a given state’s policy on respecting extra-jurisdictional
same-sex marriages.
12.
There are two basic marital property systems in the United States:
community property and separate property. Under separate property systems, spouses
own all earnings and acquisitions from earnings separately during marriage. Under
community property systems, spouses own all earnings and acquisitions from earnings
during marriage in equal and undivided shares. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 10,
at 512.
13.
Heirs are those persons designated under applicable state law to inherit an
intestate share in the property of another following the latter’s death. Id. at 544.
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marriages from sister states to be unconstitutional. In order to resolve
the multiple issues implicated in this example, a court must now
determine when Texas should consider Louise and Thelma’s once
unrecognized marriage as legal—should recognition begin retroactively
on the actual date of their commitment ceremony, the day they
registered as domestic partners, the day of their Massachusetts
marriage, or on the date of the Obergefell decision?14
In resolving the various retroactivity issues arising in the wake of
Obergefell, two distinct questions must be considered. First, to what
extent, and in which situations, should Obergefell be applied
retroactivity as to choice-of-law considerations, if at all? Second, if
Obergefell is to be applied retroactively, are there any limitations or
judicial restraints in its application as a remedial principle?
Unfortunately, the answers to these questions seem rife with
contradiction and complexity. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of the
deference to, and limitations of, the retroactivity doctrine is a predicate
to its application to Obergefell.
First, the general rule when a federal or state statute is held
unconstitutional is that the invalidated statute is thereby deemed void ab
initio—or, “null from the beginning.”15 This, of course, makes sense in
the context of a constitutional republic such as ours because legislative
bodies lack the power to make such laws; an unconstitutional law is, by
definition, an ultra vires (non-)exercise of legislative authority.
Accordingly, the current stance held by federal courts is that these
judicial rulings should be retrospective and should apply to events that
predate those judgments. 16 Moreover, while many of these
post-Obergefell disputes will concern the application of the retroactivity
doctrine to the customary domain of state laws, the Supremacy Clause
14.
The retroactive application of Obergefell to previously unrecognized, but
lawfully married, same-sex spouses will have multiple lifetime and death-time issues on
the spouses, children, and third parties. Lifetime issues may include community
property (when did it arise and how to treat any lifetime transfers of community
property), previously filed state income taxes, divorce, marital property and equitable
distributions, alimony, child custody, and visitation rights. Note that some of these
issues will also depend on how long the couple will be deemed married. Death-time
issues may include who is entitled to any award from the wrongful death claim, who
are the proper heirs under intestacy, who has standing in testate estates, when did
community property begin to accrue, homestead, elective share, family property setasides, insurance, pensions, employee benefits, previously filed estate and gift taxes,
and if there are adequate remedies for property that may have already sold or
distributed. Parentage issues may include whether J.D. was considered Thelma’s child
during her lifetime and her heir at her death. Finally, third parties, such as innocent
bona fide purchasers of property and title insurers, may also be impacted by the above
issues.
15.
Void ab initio, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For a
discussion on void ab initio, see infra Part II.B.
16.
See infra Part II.C.
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of the United States Constitution17 dictates that state courts retroactively
apply a Supreme Court decision in the choice-of-law context.18
Second, the application of the doctrine of retroactivity to remedial
considerations must also be considered—and this application is more
complicated and may lead to inconsistent judicial limitations in
fashioning adequate remedies to post-Obergefell state law disputes. In
the application of retroactivity to remedial considerations, the Court has
recognized concern for a need of finality in litigation, which may be
achieved through such procedural rules as res judicata, statutes of
limitation, and laws requiring parties aggrieved by a law to provide
timely notice of their objection. 19 For instance, in post-Obergefell
disputes, pertinent statutes of limitations may have run, or property
may have been sold to innocent third-party bona fide purchasers who
relied in good faith on the law as it stood at the time of the purchase.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has established a strong line of
precedent to make whole the discrete groups who were victims of
unconstitutionally discriminatory laws. 20 For those same-sex married
couples who were denied marital property rights under now
unconstitutional laws, retroactive application would be the only way to
provide adequate relief. Therefore, a balancing test of the competing
public policy concerns of the various parties, and their respective
property interests, will surely be part of any judicial analysis
concerning retroactive remedial considerations. Accordingly, even if
Obergefell should be applied retroactively with respect to choice-of-law
matters, adequate remedies may not be available for pre-Obergefell
deprivations of marital property rights—whether accruing during the
unrecognized portion of a same-sex marriage or upon the death of one
of the same-sex spouses.
In order to provide the background necessary to understand the
retroactive application of Obergefell to choice-of-law matters and to
appreciate potential limitations associated with remedial considerations
thereto, Part I of the this Article provides a very brief exploration of
the history of same-sex marriage in the United States, culminating in an
exploration of the Obergefell decision. Next, Part II offers a primer on
the important doctrinal issues involved in the Obergefell retroactivity
debate, including a detailed examination of the federal courts’ existing
retroactivity jurisprudence and limitations as a remedial measure; a

17.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
18.
See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 754 (1995); Harper
v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993); Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and
Prospectivity of Judgments in American Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 50 (2014).
19.
See Reynoldsville Casket Co., 514 U.S. at 755–56.
20.
See infra Part II.F.
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review of insightful analogous precedents of Trimble v. Gordon21 and
United States v. Windsor; 22 and a brief survey of effective remedies
provided under similar contexts of other discriminatory laws that were
held unconstitutional. Then, Part III analyzes the scope of Obergefell’s
retroactivity for choice-of-law considerations concerning outstanding
state law issues and proffers tailored remedies for specific and distinct
issues that might arise in post-Obergefell disputes. Finally, the Article
concludes that, on balance, Obergefell should apply purely retroactively
as to both choice-of-law matters and remedial considerations, to the
extent that adequate remedies may be fashioned to protect innocent
third parties while rectifying the property deprivations of
unconstitutionally unrecognized marriages. Accordingly, this Article
aims—through a vigorous intellectual discourse of the various
competing theories, interests, and considerations—to be a guiding
source on the practical implications that will stem from the retroactive
application of Obergefell to choice-of-law matters and to remedial
considerations.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. A (Brief) Timeline of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States
In order to better appreciate the impact of the Obergefell decision
on the current legal landscape, it is instructive to briefly review the
history of same-sex marriage in the United States. 23 Therefore, what
follows are selected excerpts of the development of the law surrounding
same-sex marriage in the United States.
The modern history of same-sex marriage in the United States is a
relatively brief narrative, especially compared to other social and
political movements that encompass evolving notions of equality.
Perhaps surprisingly, many modern gay rights advocates did not always
promote the notion of same-sex marriage.24 During the early days of the
modern gay rights movement, activists ignored or downplayed the
same-sex marriage topic because they thought the topic was too
controversial, unobtainable, and fostered the notion of gays and
lesbians assimilating to a heteronormative family paradigm. 25 In fact,
21.
430 U.S. 762 (1977).
22.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
23.
For a detailed account of the historical evolution of legal status of samesex marriage in the United States, see Tritt & Duffey, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1101–02.
24.
See Patrick J. Egan & Kenneth Sherrill, Marriage and the Shifting
Priorities of a New Generation of Lesbians and Gays, 38 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 229,
229 (2005) (noting that same-sex marriage is a recent priority of gay advocates).
25.
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality:
The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2015).
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the American narrative of the legal progression of same-sex marriage
merely begins a little over two decades ago when the Hawaii Supreme
Court decided Baehr v. Lewin.26 Prior to 2004, same-sex marriage was
not performed in any United States jurisdiction. Since that time, various
legal elements concerning same-sex marriages have been tested,
including the licensing of same-sex marriages, the recognition of the
validity of these licenses, and the recognition of extra-jurisdictional
same-sex marriages. During this very brief time period, though, all of
these interconnected legal components have been resolved.
The relevant legal timeline of same-sex marriage in the United
States begins in Hawaii in 1993. In Baehr, a lawsuit in which three
same-sex couples argued that Hawaii’s prohibition of same-sex
marriage violated the state constitution, the Hawaii Supreme Court held
that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the Equal
Protection clause of the Hawaii State Constitution. 27 The Hawaii
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a
determination of whether the state could show a compelling reason for
the justification of the same-sex marriage ban; 28 and the trial court
judge rejected the state’s justifications for limiting marriage to oppositesex couples.29 One ramification of the Baehr decision was immediate:
the Hawaii State Legislature promptly proposed a constitutional
amendment that expressly reserved to the legislature the power to
relegate marriage to opposite-sex couples only—and Hawaii voters
passed the amendment in 1998.30
The Baehr decision had another direct, but more significant,
repercussion: the so-called Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 31
DOMA was signed into law by President Clinton in 1996.32 Notably, at
the time DOMA was enacted, neither same-sex marriage nor
26.
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
27.
Id. at 581–82.
28.
Id. at 583.
29.
Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
30.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2–3 (1996). This amendment to the state’s
constitution differed from future state constitutional amendments in that it did not
proscribe an absolute prohibition on same-sex marriages but rather allowed the state
legislature to decide. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. In 2013, the state legislature legalized
same-sex marriage under the Hawaii Marriage Equality Act. S.B. 1 27th Leg. (Haw.
2013).
31.
The Baehr case was specifically cited in the House Judiciary Committee’s
report. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 2–3 (1996). Concerned with both state and federal
implications of the legalization of same-sex marriage, the stated purposes of the statute
were (1) “to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage” and (2) “to
protect the right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal
recognition of same-sex unions . . . .” Id. at 2.
32.
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
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polygamous marriage33 was legal in any state, territory, or possession
of the United States. 34 Section 2 of DOMA was an exercise of
Congressional discretion granted under Article IV, Section 1 of the
United States Constitution, which is commonly called the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 35 This section purported to grant states autonomy in
choosing whether to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
United States jurisdictions36 by providing an exception to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Despite this protection, many states decided to seek
additional protection under the judicially-created public policy
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 37 Section 3 of DOMA
restricted, for all federal purposes, the definitions of “marriage” and
“spouse” to opposite-gender couples, even though at the time no states
allowed or recognized same-sex marriage. 38 Moreover, the federal
enactment of DOMA prompted state legislatures to enact reform
measures that banned same-sex marriage and prohibited the recognition
of legally married same-sex couples from sister states.39
33.
These two are the only two types of marriages that are facially restricted
by the text of Section 3 of DOMA. The issue of polygamy has not been broadly
addressed in the debate surrounding DOMA and, thus, will not be further addressed by
this Article.
34.
For a brief history of same-sex marriage over the past forty years, see
Richard Wolf, Timeline: Same-sex Marriage Through the Years, USA TODAY (June 26,
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/06/24/same-sex-marriagetimeline/29173703/ [https://perma.cc/C7K2-375U].
35.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Specifically, the provision reads “Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.” Id. (emphasis added).
36.
As previously noted in this section, at the time of enactment, there were
no such jurisdictions. See Wolf, supra note 34.
37.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(a)(1)(A) (2011) (“It is the public
policy of the State of Arkansas to recognize the marital union only of man and
woman.”).
38.
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419,
2419 (1996). Section 3 became the subject of most of the controversy surrounding the
Act, and the challenged provision in United States v. Windsor. As states began to
permit same-sex marriages, DOMA had the effect of creating two tiers of marriages:
those that were recognized by the federal government and those that were not.
39.
In the immediate wake of DOMA’s enactment, several states passed
“Baby DOMA” statutes that substantially mimicked the provisions of the Defense of
Marriage Act. The states that enacted Baby DOMAs in 1996 included Alaska, ALASKA
STAT. § 25.05.011(a) (1996); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(C) (1996);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-201(1)
(1996); Illinois, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) (1996); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §
23-2508 (1996); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.1 (1996); Missouri, MO. REV.
STAT. § 451.022 (1996) (amended 2001); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2
(1996); Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (1997); South Carolina, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-1-15 (1996); and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (1996). Until
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The next major landmark in the evolution of same-sex marriage in
the United States was Baker v. State,40 where three same-sex couples
sued the state of Vermont after being denied marriage licenses.41 The
Vermont Supreme Court held that the denial of a marriage license to a
same-sex couple violated the “common benefits” clause of the state
constitution and ordered the legislature to extend marriage or at least
the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples. 42 The result was the
nation’s first “civil union” legislation, which gave same-sex couples the
choice to enter into a civil union with all of the rights and
responsibilities of marriage—denying their relationships only the word
“marriage.”43
The year 2003 marked another milestone for same-sex marriage
with the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. 44 In Goodridge, Gay and
Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) sued the Massachusetts
Department of Health in the Massachusetts Superior Court on behalf of
seven same-sex couples who had been denied marriage licenses. 45
Under a rational basis review, the court held that the limitation of
benefits—including marriage—to same-sex couples was a violation of
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ Equal
Protection Clause.46 On May 17, 2004, for the first time in American
history, same-sex marriages were legally recognized in
Massachusetts.47

2007, many other states followed suit by enacting legislative statutes and constitutional
amendments in order to ban same-sex marriages and provide for the non-recognition of
extra-judicial same-sex marriages performed in other states. In 2007, South Carolina
would become the last state to enact a constitutional same-sex marriage ban, although it
had already banned same sex marriage by statute in 1996. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15
(2007). For a detailed timeline and an index of citations of all of the state legislative
statutes and constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, see Tritt & Duffey,
supra note 1, ¶¶ 1101.1, 1109.
40.
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
41.
Id. at 867–68.
42.
Id. at 886.
43.
Id.; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (2016).
44.
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
45.
Id. at 949–50.
46.
Id. at 961.
47.
Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/17/us/massachusettsarrives-at-moment-for-same-sex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/56WX-XJ74]. It is
worthy of reflection to note the first same-sex couples who were legally allowed to
marry attained this right merely thirteen years ago and in only this one state. This
restricted time period and limited numbers of affected same-sex married couples could
have weighty legal repercussions in the Obergerfell retroactivity analysis.
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In 2008, the California Supreme Court found California’s statutory
ban on same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional. 48 Soon after that
decision, California voters passed Proposition 8, a state constitutional
ban on same-sex marriage. 49 In 2010, the Northern District of
California struck down Proposition 8, holding it to be
unconstitutional.50 The case would later be heard in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as Perry v. Brown, 51 which
upheld the holding, before Hollingsworth v. Perry52 was finally argued
in front of the United States Supreme Court.53
Following a similar judicial path, in 2008 the Connecticut Supreme
Court found that statutes restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples
violated the state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. 54 Later, in
2009, the Connecticut legislature legalized same-sex marriage by
adopting marriage statutes with gender-neutral language.55
In 2013, the fight to legalize same-sex marriage challenged a
federal law for the first time. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed 56 a decision by the Southern District of New York, which
found Section 3 of DOMA to be unconstitutional.57 A decision affirmed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, where the surviving
spouse of a same-sex married couple sought to claim the federal estate
tax marital deduction, the United States Supreme Court ultimately
heard a challenge to Section 3 of DOMA, which defined “marriage”
and “spouse” as excluding same-sex partners for purposes of federal
law.58 The Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 was an unconstitutional
“deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth
Amendment,” and that the Constitution prevents the federal government
48.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (2008).
49.
50.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
51.
671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’g, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
52.
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding petitioners did not have standing to
appeal the district court’s ruling declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutional).
53.
Id.
54.
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 947 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008).
55.
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-20, -28a, -28b (2015). Also in 2009, the Iowa
Supreme Court found the state’s statutory ban to be unconstitutional in Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009), and Vermont passed a statute authorizing
same-sex marriage. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009). Over the next six years, many
states would authorize same-sex marriage through judicial decisions, legislative actions,
and popular votes. For a detailed timeline and an index of citations of all of the state
court decisions, legislative statutes, and popular votes allowing same-sex marriage, see
Tritt & Duffey, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1101.1-.2.
56.
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012).
57.
Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
58.
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013) (citing Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2012)).
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from treating same-sex marriages any differently from heterosexual
marriages.59 Such differentiation, the Court reasoned, would “demean[]
the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution
protects.” 60 Although it left the District Court’s holding undisturbed,
the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Perry.61
On June 27, 2013, the day after Windsor, same-sex marriage was
allowed in thirteen states. Immediately following Windsor, federal and
state courts were flooded with litigation related to the decision.
Tellingly, Tom Watts writes that “[t]he marriage[] equality cases may
represent the first time in American legal history that a single
constitutional question has been so rapidly and broadly litigated.” 62
There were constitutional challenges in twenty-six states.63 In general,
the challenges concerned either the inability of same-sex couples to
obtain marriage licenses or a state refusing to recognize extrajurisdictional same-sex marriages.64 After the decision in Windsor, five
federal circuit courts of appeal upheld district court decisions
invalidating prohibitions on same-sex marriages,65 and one decision by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a ban on same-sex
marriage. 66 Obergefell v. Hodges resulted from the consolidation of
these cases.67 At the time of the Obergefell decision, thirty-seven states
and the District of Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage. 68 Of
59.
Id. at 2695–96.
60.
Id. at 2694.
61.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
62.
Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage
Equality Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 52, 53 (2015).
63.
State-by-State
History
of
Banning
and
Legalizing
Gay
Marriage,
1994-2015,
PROCON.ORG,
http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.
resource.php?resourceID=004857 [https://perma.cc/BK86-C5AX] (last updated Feb.
16, 2016).
64.
Generally, provisions governing non-recognition of extra-jurisdictional
same-sex marriages are fairly generic. Virtually all provide, in one way or another, that
same-sex marriages performed outside the jurisdiction are void inside the jurisdiction
and will not be recognized. However, some states went further—or are, at the very
least, more express—in their non-recognition provisions. Georgia, uniquely, has a
constitutional non-recognition provision that expressly bans divorce proceedings for
same-sex couples. GA. CONST. art. I, § 4 para. I(b) (2004). See also ALA. CONST. art.
I, § 36.03 (2006), ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (1998); ARK. CONST. amend. 83, §§ 1–3
(2004), ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (1997).
65.
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766
F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer,
760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014); Bishop v.
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1230 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
66.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014).
67.
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
68.
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
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these states, twenty-six allowed same-sex marriage by court decision,
eight states by state legislative action, and three by popular vote.69 At
the same time, thirteen states banned same-sex marriages. 70 Of the
remaining states, twelve banned same-sex marriage by constitutional
amendments or state statutes or a combination of both.71
The idea of same-sex marriage gained a significant amount of
support during a relatively short period of time. Spanning less than
twenty-five years, the judicial system drastically changed the reality of
same-sex relationships in the United States. It wasn’t until Obergefell,
however, that the right to a same-sex marriage became fundamental.
B. Obergefell v. Hodges
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court limited its consideration to only
two questions: “whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to
license a marriage between two people of the same sex” and “whether
the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to recognize a same-sex
marriage licensed and performed in a State which does grant that
right.”72 On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its
opinion—exactly two years to the day from the Court’s decision in
Windsor. Regarding the first question, the Court held that the denial of
marriage to same-sex couples violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution.73 In striking down state laws to
the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples, the Court bound
marriage to an individual’s dignity, liberty, and social status. 74
Regarding the second question, the Court held that:
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry
in all States. It follows that the Court also must hold—and it
now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to

Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. State-by-State History of Banning and Legalizing Gay
Marriage, 1994-2015, supra note 63. In addition, eight Native American tribal
jurisdictions permitted same-sex marriages. Tritt & Duffey, supra note 1, ¶ 1101.2.
69.
State-by-State History of Banning and Legalizing Gay Marriage, 19942015, supra note 63.
70.
Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
73.
Id. at 2604.
74.
Id. at 2596.
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refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in
another State on the ground of its same-sex character. 75

It must be noted that the Court also addressed the long-standing
debate over the applicability of Baker v. Nelson. 76 In Obergefell, the
Supreme Court stated that “Baker v. Nelson must be and now is
overruled.”77
Although the Court was specific in answering the two limited
questions before it, the Court unfortunately did not provide guidance
concerning the retroactivity of its decision. In 2010, the United States
Census Bureau estimated that there were 605,472 same-sex couples in
the United States (less than one-half of one percent of all tax returns
files), of which approximately 168,000 (27.8%) self-identified as
married. 78 Of note, among the same-sex couples that identify as
married, more than half (56% or approximately 94,000 couples)
resided in states that did not recognize same-sex marriage.79
Following the legalization of same-sex marriage, previously
unrecognized same-sex spouses must wait to see what remedies will be
available concerning the marital rights, protections, and benefits that
were denied prior to Obergefell. For same-sex married couples who
lived in non-recognition states before the Obergefell decision, when
must these former non-recognition states recognize the establishment of
their marriages—on the date of their marriage ceremony, on the date of
the Obergefell decision, or another prospective date enacted by state

75.
Id. at 2607–08.
76.
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). This was a case in which two gay men
applied for a marriage license in Minnesota. Id. at 185. The Minnesota Supreme Court
ruled that a state limiting marriage to persons of the opposite sex did not violate the
United States Constitution. Id. at 187. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal “for want of a substantial federal question.” Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). Because the case came to
the Supreme Court through mandatory appellate review, the dismissal constituted a
decision on the merits and established Baker v. Nelson as precedent. The extent of the
precedential effect has been subject to debate.
77.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605. Overruling Baker may play into any
analysis concerning whether Obergefell created a new law or merely explained existing
law concerning a fundamental right.
78.
See American Community Survey Data on Same Sex Couples,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/acs.html
[https://perma.cc/8SGL-86W2] (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) (It is not known whether all
who self-identified as married were legally married in a jurisdiction recognizing samesex marriages).
79.
See id.; see also Martin O’Connell & Sarah Feliz, Same-sex Couple
Household Statistics From the 2010 Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Working
Paper No. 2011-26, 2011), www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/decennial.html
[https://perma.cc/965G-YW4V].
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legislative bodies? 80 In order to provide guidance to courts, state
legislators, and legal practitioners, an exploration of the federal courts’
existing retroactivity jurisprudence and an examination of the how this
jurisprudence has been applied as precedent under similar contexts is
greatly needed.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RETROACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
An exploration of both the American retroactivity jurisprudence
and analogous examples of its application and remedies are needed in
order to develop an analytical framework for resolving retroactivity
issues for post-Obergefell disputes. First, a cognitive analysis of
Obergefell’s retroactive impact on choice-of-law matters and remedial
considerations must begin with a comprehensive exploration of the
applicable jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of retroactivity and any
limitations thereto. Further, a review of Trimble and its progeny will
provide insightful, pertinent, and analogous examples in order to tease
out the nuances of potential remedial limitations concerning property
transfers during life and at death. In addition, a review of Windsor and
its retroactive application concerning federal marital rights and benefits
to same-sex marriages will offer useful insights concerning postObergefell retroactivity issues. Finally, a review of judicial remedies
crafted and implemented following other discriminatory laws that were
declared unconstitutional on account of affecting a discrete group of
victims will provide a springboard for analyzing retroactive remedial
considerations for post-Obergefell disputes.
A. Judicial Decision-making
The issuance of any judicial decision that declares a law
unconstitutional raises critical questions regarding what the retroactive
effect of the court’s holding should be,81 if any.82 Those questions are

80.
The language of the Obergefell decision notes “lawful same-sex
marriages performed in other States.” 135 S. Ct. at 2585. If the quoted language means
a state need not recognize a valid same-sex marriage performed in another country,
obviously then May 17, 2004 would be the earliest possible date of recognition.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
81.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 216 (3d ed.
2000) (judicial decisions are said to have retroactive (or “retrospective”) effect where
they govern claims rooted in facts antedating the decision).
82.
See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 146 (2015) (“The United States Constitution
neither requires nor prohibits retroactive or prospective application of a new decision,
and the determination of whether a decision overruling a former decision should be
applied retroactively or merely prospectively is generally a matter of judicial discretion
to be applied on a case-by-case basis. In civil cases, the court may, in its equitable
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particularly pronounced with respect to Obergefell. In efforts to
anticipate how courts might handle some of these questions concerning
post-Obergefell disputes, we must examine the possibilities in the
context of the United States Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine.
In general, a judicial decision can be applied to subsequent cases in
a number of ways: (1) purely retroactively, whereby the rule of law
announced by the decision is applied to all events which gave rise to the
subsequent litigation; (2) partly retroactively, whereby the rule is
applied to some, usually the primary, conduct which gave rise to the
subsequent litigation; (3) selectively prospectively, whereby the rule
may be applied retroactively to the parties before the court, but may be
applied only prospectively to other parties in similar circumstances but
whose cases are not pending; (4) purely prospectively, whereby the rule
may only be applied to subsequent litigants whose cases arise from
operative facts arising after the pronouncement of the rule; and, finally,
(5) prospectively prospective, whereby a court chooses to delay the
effect of the rule, applying it only to litigants after a certain period of
time.83
This spectrum of possible approaches raises a number of
interesting questions, some of which go to the very heart of legal
jurisprudence.84 For instance, Professor Laurence H. Tribe writes that
the retroactivity doctrine is “a reflection of the applicable theory of
lawmaking.”85 Justice Blackstone and Justice Scalia, for example, have
opined that judicial decision-making should be the clarification of rules
already in existence.86 This notion is rooted in the generalization that
while legislatures make new law, courts merely interpret the law (or,
rather, declare the law as it already stood).

discretion, prohibit or limit retroactive operation of its ruling, where the overruled law
has been justifiably relied upon or where retroactive operation creates a burden.”).
83.
See Kay, supra note 18, at 43–44; see also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 146.
84.
See TRIBE, supra note 81, at 233–35 (“The Court’s retroactivity decisions
. . . reflect much deeper divisions about the process of adjudication generally—and
deeper issues about what it means to decide a question of law . . . . Different models of
the judicial process provide different perspectives on the problem of whether a decision
should be given retrospective effect.”).
85.
Id. at 216.
86.
See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it,
which is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, rather than
decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69, 69 (15th ed. 1809) (explaining that the duty of the
court is not to “pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one”); see
also Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71
YALE L.J. 907, 907 (1962).
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This theory of judicial decision-making, though, may be
oversimplified, and presents some logical problems. For example, if
courts are only declaring what the law already was, then any limited
application—any application outside of pure retroactivity—would seem
a deprivation of justice.87 Under both Justices Blackstone and Scalia’s
view, all parties to litigation ought to be able to take full advantage of
the rule of law as newly interpreted, and have it apply to every event
that has given rise to their dispute.88 Otherwise, the litigants are refused
the benefits of the law simply because the courts struggled to timely
arrive at their expression.
Giving all parties such benefit may prove impracticable, though, in
practice. Parties must rely on prior expressions of courts, and it is
important to remember that new interpretations of the law are not made
in a single-party vacuum. Thus, the retroactive recognition of one
party’s right may be to the detriment of another party that had
reasonably relied on a court’s prior expression of law. Accordingly,
under both Justices Blackstone and Scalia’s view, retroactivity may be
more of a normative view of the courts: a rule of thumb meant to
combat judicial activism.
The view that judges actually make new law is more realistic, 89
and far more accepted today.90 This view is often traced to Nineteenth
87.
1 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1:9 (3d ed. 2011)
(“The issue of retroactivity of constitutional decisions has been contentious for the
Supreme Court Justices. It strikes at the heart of the way in which they define their
role. If judges who interpret the Constitution only apply existing law—and never
‘make’ new law—then all of their decisions should be fully retroactive. If, however, the
judicial role includes articulation of new rules, then restricting retroactivity makes good
sense. It is unfair to those who reasonably relied upon existing law to subject them to
rules and potential liability that they had no reason to anticipate.”).
88.
Justice Scalia has directly addressed the point in arguing that because the
power of the judiciary is only to discern the law, and not to make new law, its decisions
should always be applied retroactively, despite inevitable practical difficulties in certain
circumstances. James Beam, 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
explained that while automatic retroactivity may give rise to practical difficulties when
courts overrule precedent, “those difficulties are one of the understood checks upon
judicial law-making; to eliminate them is to render courts substantially more free to
‘make new law,’ and thus to alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of
responsibility and power among the three branches.” Id.
89.
Justice O’Connor, quoting Justice Frankfurter, has explained that “[w]e
should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law . .
. . It is much more conducive to law's self-respect to recognize candidly the
considerations that give prospective context to a new pronouncement of law.” Harper
v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 116–17 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
90.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1759 (1991) (“It would be only
a slight exaggeration to say that there are no more Blackstonians. The insistence that
judges could simply find the true and timeless rule, uninfluenced by evolving moral
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century legal positivist John Austin,91 who maintained that “judges do
in fact do something more than discover law; they make it interstitially
by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic
statutory or common-law terms that alone are but the empty crevices of
the law.”92 Indeed, this view is supported by language found across the
Court’s modern jurisprudence. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas,93
Justice Kennedy, who also authored Obergefell, closed the opinion by
opining the following:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they
might have been more specific. They did not presume to have
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary
and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles
in their own search for greater freedom.94
Exactly twelve years later in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy cited
Lawrence, writing:
If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then
received practices could serve as their own continued
justification and new groups could not invoke rights once
denied. This Court has rejected that approach, both with
respect to the right to marry and the rights of gays and
lesbians.95
The great debate regarding positivist versus declaratory judicial
decision-making, along with questions regarding the proper role of the
courts, the proper role of the legislature, and the nature of the law

values and social policies, now seems anachronistic. Justice Harlan, for example,
rejected Blackstone's jurisprudential claims even as he criticized the quasi-legislative
approach to lawmaking that he detected in the Warren Court's non-retroactivity
policy.”) (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
91.
See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
(1832), in THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY
OF JURISPRUDENCE 1, 191 (1954).
92.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1965) (comparing the views
of Blackstone and Austin).
93.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
94.
Id. at 578–79.
95.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
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itself, is ongoing. For now, though, we examine the doctrine of void ab
intio and the interrelated retroactivity jurisprudence as it stands today,
however disorganized.
B. Void ab initio
When a federal or state statute is declared unconstitutional, the
general rule is that the statute is void ab initio, 96 meaning “null from
the beginning.”97 In other words, the unconstitutional statute is wholly
void and ineffective for any purpose. Since its unconstitutionality dates
from the time of its enactment, and not from the date of the decision
striking the statute, it is as if the statute had never been passed and had
never existed. Once a statute is held to be void ab initio, private
citizens and divisions of the state cannot take any further action
pursuant to that statute’s provisions.98
When such an act is held to be unconstitutional by a court and the
general assembly fails to subsequently repeal, amend, or modify it, the
act is no longer valid law. 99 The void ab initio rule only applies to
statutes that are facially unconstitutional, or those unconstitutional in all
of their applications, and not to statutes that are unconstitutional only
when applied to a certain set of facts.100
The term was famously formulated in Norton v. Shelby County,101
where the court held that “an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though

96.
16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 195. (“The general rule is that an
unconstitutional statute, whether federal or state, though having the form and name of
law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose. Since
unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of
the decision so branding it, an unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as
inoperative as if it had never been passed and never existed; that is, it is void ab
initio.”).
97.
Void ab initio, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
98.
Thomas v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 478 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996), aff’d, 485 S.E.2d 295 (N.C. 1997).
99.
People v. Taylor, 448 N.E.2d 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that the
defendant’s conviction could not stand when, at the time of the defendant’s conviction,
the statute under which he was convicted had not been amended to remedy a prior
ruling that it was unconstitutional).
100.
See People v. Mosley, 33 N.E.3d 137 (Ill. 2015); Lummi Indian Nation v.
State, 241 P.3d 1220 (Wash. 2010). But see Stavenjord v. Mont. St. Fund, No. 20000207, 2004 WL 3093058 (Mont. Work. Comp. Ct. Aug. 27, 2004) (holding that the
statute in question was only unconstitutional as applied, not on its face, and thus was
not retroactive).
101.
118 U.S. 425 (1886) (applying a theory of void ab initio, following
Blackstone’s declaratory view of judicial decision-making).
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it had never been passed.”102 Since this time, the doctrine has been used
with respect to everything from contracts signed under duress, to
statutes that were found unconstitutional.103
Generally, when a statute is held to be void ab initio, this decision
should be applied retroactively. 104 Laws may change primarily by
legislative or judicial action. Judicial action has proven more
complicated than legislative action, as there is a distinction between
judicial decisions that declare a statute unconstitutional and those that
change established principles of common law. 105 This distinction in
degrees of reliance is what dictates strict adherence to the void ab initio
rule when a statute is declared unconstitutional, especially when applied
to fundamental rights.106 When a statute is declared unconstitutional by
a judiciary, the decision should apply retroactively.107 To do otherwise
would violate due process under the United States Constitution and
would prevent citizens who are guaranteed those rights under the
Constitution from receiving a remedy for such a violation.108 However,
courts have wrestled with the idea that sometimes it is necessary to
uphold the validity of certain transactions or events that occurred before
a statute was declared void ab initio. 109 Therefore, a review of the

102.
Id. at 442.
103.
See TRIBE, supra note 81 (“If an unconstitutional statute or practice
effectively never existed as a lawful justification for state action, individuals convicted
under the statute or in trials which tolerated the practice were convicted unlawfully
even if their trials took place before the declaration of unconstitutionality; such a
declaration should have a fully retroactive effect, and previously convicted individuals
should be able to win their freedom through the writ of habeas corpus. Alternatively, if
a judgment of unconstitutionality governs only the case at hand, the legality of the
convictions of individuals previously tried is not affected.”).
104.
Felzak v. Hruby, 855 N.E.2d 202, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Trustees of
Wofford Coll. v. Burnett, 209 S.E.2d 155, 159 (S.C. 1946); see also Atkinson v. S.
Express Co., 78 S.E. 516, 519 (S.C. 1913) (“When a statute is adjudged to be
unconstitutional, it is as if it had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; . . . it
constitutes a protection to no one who has acted under it . . . .”) (internal quotation
omitted) (citations omitted).
105.
People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Ill. 1990) (holding that only
judicial decisions which declare a statute unconstitutional should be given retroactive
effect).
106.
Id. at 287; Yakubinis v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 847 N.E.2d 552,
558–59, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
107.
Gersch, 553 N.E.2d at 289.
108.
Id.
109.
See Herndon v. Moore, 18 S.C. 339, 352 (S.C. 1883) (applying the
exceptional doctrine of communis error facit jus, or “common error makes right,” to
hold the vast number of sales involving thousands of acres of land during a ten-year
period by probate courts were valid even though probate courts were later determined
not to have subject matter jurisdiction to conduct such sales because the statute granting
such jurisdiction was held unconstitutional).
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jurisprudence concerning retroactive applications of judgments and
remedies is in order.
C. The Retroactivity Doctrine
The modern retroactivity doctrine began to evolve in the latter half
of the twentieth century, although the doctrine and its limitations have
been inconsistently applied by courts. 110 Historically, the general rule
has been that legislation is presumptively prospective in operation, 111
while judicial decisions are presumptively retroactive in operation. 112
Over time, though, the retroactivity doctrine has splintered into two
separate jurisprudential avenues evolving around two distinct legal
disciplines: criminal law and civil law. Because Obergefell is a civil
case clearly addressing the denial of fundamental rights, this Article
focuses on the prong of retroactivity surrounding civil law. 113

110.
The first true modern retroactivity decision, Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965), was decided on June 7, 1965. Criticism of the retroactivity doctrine
has continued in the following decades. For a thorough overview of the history of the
retroactive and prospective application of judicial decisions, see Bradly Scott Shannon,
The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 811 (2003). See also, e.g., Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the
Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness,
and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161, 166 (2005) (“For the
past forty years, the Court has struggled with these concerns, producing a lineage of
cases that have generated varying reactions as to their efficiency and fairness . . . .”);
Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative
Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (1999) (“[Modern jurisprudence] has not
freed itself from the difficulties that attended the Warren Court’s jurisprudence, and the
current law of retroactivity is widely regarded as intellectually unsatisfactory. This is
terribly ironic, for what has happened is that the concept of retroactivity has assumed
greater prominence as part of an attempt to solve a problem that was created by the
introduction of that very concept.”).
111.
See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 146 (2015 & Supp. 2016). For an iteration
of the Court’s stance on retroactive effect of legislation, see Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
112.
See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 146. “Traditionally, ‘both the common law
and [the Court’s] own decisions recognized a general rule of retrospective effect for the
constitutional decisions of [the] Court . . . subject to [certain] limited exceptions . . .
.’” TRIBE, supra note 81 (quoting Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973)); see
also Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 84, 106–07 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(discussing the lengthy history of retroactivity of judicial decisions). But see Bouie v.
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353, 355 (1964) (“[A]n unforeseeable judicial
enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex
post facto law . . . . [T]he effect is to deprive [the defendant] of due process of law in
the sense of fair warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime.”).
113.
The remainder of this Article will deal with retroactivity in the civil
context. For a comparison of the criminal and civil retroactivity doctrines, see Pamela
J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance and Stare Decisis, 48
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515 (1998); see also Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary
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In this civil context, the modern test was established in 1971 in
Chevron Oil v. Huson,114 where the Court established a three-factor test
to decide whether a judgment should deviate from the norm of
retroactivity afforded to civil cases. 115 While pretrial discovery was
underway in Chevron Oil, 116 the Court decided Rodrigue v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. 117 Rodrigue held that under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (Lands Act),118 federal law supplemented
by a state’s statutes of limitations applied to cases of personal injury
that occurred on artificial island drilling rigs.119 Chevron Oil arose from
a personal injury suit under the Lands Act as well, and the Court had to
decide whether the suit was barred because the case was brought after
Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations expired, even though
admiralty law was the governing precedent at the time of the case’s
filing, not the one year statute of limitations.120
The Court determined that retroactivity may be denied (1) to a
“new principle of law . . . on which litigants may have relied,” (2) if
such limitation would avoid “injustice or hardship” and (3) it would not
unduly undermine the “purpose and effect” of the new rule.121 After an
examination of these factors, the Court held that “[b]oth a devotion to
the underlying purpose of the Land Act’s absorption of state law and a
weighing of the equities requires nonretroactive application of the state
statute of limitations here.”122
The Court’s three-factor Chevron Oil test governed for many
years. However, in 1990, the Court’s plurality opinion in American
Trucking v. Smith 123 signaled a shift in the current civil retroactivity
Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmkaing, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2145 (1996);
TRIBE, supra note 81.
114.
404 U.S. 97 (1971).
115.
Id. at 106–07.
116.
Id. at 99.
117.
395 U.S. 352 (1969).
118.
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356 (2012).
119.
Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355.
120.
Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 98–99.
121.
Id. at 106–07. (“First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must
establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which
litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution
was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must . . . weigh
the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or
retard its operation.’ Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive
application, for ‘[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable
results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the
injustice or hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity.’”) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
122.
Id. at 109.
123.
496 U.S. 167 (1990).
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doctrine. 124 In American Trucking, the Court framed the issue as
whether the Court’s previous decision in American Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 125 which held state application of flat
highway use taxes unconstitutional,126 would be “applie[d] retroactively
to taxation of highway use prior to the date of that decision” that had
occurred in Arkansas as a result of the state’s Highway Use
Equalization tax.127 As Professor Jill E. Fisch noted, the Court decided
that the “retroactive application of the earlier decision invalidating
certain highway use taxes under the Commerce Clause would unfairly
burden the state’s current operations and future plans made in reliance
on the tax revenues collected.”128
Importantly, the plurality emphasized that “retroactivity of
decisions in the civil context ‘continue[d] to be governed by the
standard announced in Chevron Oil.’”129 The plurality continued:
The principles underlying the Court’s civil retroactivity
doctrine can be distilled from both criminal and civil cases
considering this issue. When the Court concludes that a lawchanging decision should not be applied retroactively, its
decision is usually based on its perception that such
application would have a harsh and disruptive effect on those
who relied on prior law. In order to protect such reliance
interests, the Court first identifies and defines the operative
conduct or events that would be affected by the new decision.
Lower courts considering the applicability of the new
decision to pending cases are then instructed as follows: If the
operative conduct or events occurred before the law-changing
decision, a court should apply the law prevailing at the time
of the conduct. If the operative conduct or events occurred
after the decision, so that any reliance on old precedent would
be unjustified, a court should apply the new law.130

124.
Id.; Stephens, supra note 113, at 1530.
125.
483 U.S. 266 (1987). Throughout the remainder of the article, “American
Trucking” shall represent the Smith case, and this case shall be represented as
“Scheiner.”
126.
Id. at 269.
127.
American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 171.
128.
Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1060–61 (1997); see also American Trucking, 496 U.S. at
182–83.
129.
American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 178 (alternation in original) (quoting
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 n.8 (1987)).
130.
Id. at 191 (citations omitted).
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The plurality applied the Chevron Oil three-factor test and held
that each weighed in favor of non-retroactivity. 131 Justice O’Connor
wrote that “[i]t is . . . a fundamental tenet of [the Court’s] retroactivity
doctrine that the prospective application of a new principle of law
begins on the date of the decision announcing the principle.”132
However, Justice Stevens, in his dissent in American Trucking in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined,
“distinguish[ed] between retroactivity as a choice-of-law rule and
retroactivity as a remedial principle.”133 Justice Stevens explained:
A decision may be denied “retroactive effect” in the sense
that conduct occurring prior to the date of decision is not
judged under current law, or it may be denied “retroactive
effect” in the sense that independent principles of law limit
the relief that a court may provide under current law. . . .
This case, which comes to us from state court, requires us for
the first time to expressly distinguish between retroactivity as
a choice-of-law rule and retroactivity as a remedial
principle.134
As Professor Laurence H. Tribe explains, “Justice Stevens argued
that the Chevron Oil factors are relevant only as equitable
considerations in deciding what type of relief is appropriate, not in
determining what law to apply in the first instance.” 135 In the end,
though, American Trucking “left unresolved the precise extent to which
the presumptively retroactive effect of this Court’s decisions may be
altered in civil cases.”136
Doubts about Chevron Oil resurfaced in James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia. 137 James Beam dealt with the issue of selective
prospectivity, i.e., the practice of applying a newly announced rule to
particular litigants in front of the court but making the rule otherwise
131.
See id. at 179–83 (The plurality focused on factor three, “the equities of
retroactive application of Scheiner,” the most. They decided that it would be too large
of a burden on the state of Arkansas to provide relief and that retroactive application
“would be unjust”).
132.
Id. at 187.
133.
TRIBE, supra note 81, at 220 (emphasis removed).
134.
American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 209–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135.
TRIBE, supra note 81, at 220–21 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Justice O’Connor’s plurality rejected this argument, writing: “While application of the
principles of retroactivity may have remedial effects, they are not themselves remedial
principles.” American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 195–96 (Justice O’Connor explained that
“Chevron Oil is better understood as part of the doctrine of stare decisis, rather than as
part of the law of remedies”).
136.
Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 (1993).
137.
501 U.S. 529, 532, 536 (1991).
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prospective for future litigants. 138 The case produced five separate
opinions, none of which garnered more than three votes, but a majority
(six) of the justices did rally around the idea of rejecting selective
prospectivity and three of those six rejected the idea of prospectivity
entirely. 139 Justice Souter, delivering the judgment of the Court, and
joined in his opinion by Justice Stevens, concluded that once the Court
has applied a rule of law to litigants in one case, it must do so with
respect to all similarly situated litigants not barred by procedural
requirements or res judicata.140
Also of note, Justice Souter appeared to draw the same distinction
between choice-of-law and remedial considerations drawn by Justice
Stevens in American Trucking.141 Justice Souter opined that whether a
new rule should apply retroactively is in the first instance a matter of
choice of law. But, “[o]nce a rule is found to apply ‘backward,’” he
wrote, “there may then be a further issue of remedies, i.e., whether the

138.
Id. at 532, 536. James Beam involved the question of whether a 1984
holding by the court, Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984), declaring
a Hawaiian excise tax on imported alcohol unconstitutional, should apply retroactively
to a similar Georgia tax (even though it was repealed in 1985) and entitle those seeking
relief to a refund for taxes paid pre-1984. Id.
139.
Justices Blackmun, Marshal, and Scalia rejected prospectivity entirely.
See James Beam, 501 U.S. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 548 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 545–46 (White, J., concurring). Justice Souter, delivering the
opinion of the Court, was joined by Justice Stevens, and rejected selective prospectivity
stating: “Griffith cannot be confined to the criminal law.” Id. at 540–41. Justice White
also delivered a concurring opinion rejecting selective prospectivity, but differed from
other concurring opinions in that he believed Griffith had been wrongly decided. Id. at
545–46 (White, J., concurring).
140.
Id. at 540.
141.
Id. at 543–44 (citations omitted) (rejecting selective prospectivity, Justice
Souter argued that: “Because the rejection of modified prospectivity precludes
retroactive application of a new rule to some litigants when it is not applied to others,
the Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the
particular case. Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is
chosen for all others who might seek its prospective application. The applicability of
rules of law are not to be switched on and off according to individual hardship;
allowing relitigation of choice-of-law issues would only compound the challenge to the
stabilizing purpose of precedent posed in the first instance by the very development of
‘new’ rules. Of course, the generalized enquiry permits litigants to assert, and the
courts to consider, the equitable and reliance interests of parties absent but similarly
situated. Conversely, nothing we say here precludes consideration of individual equities
when deciding remedial issues in particular cases.” Justice Souter expounded on this
conclusion by adding: “The grounds for our decision today are narrow. They are
confined entirely to an issue of choice of law: when the Court has applied a new rule of
law to the litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by
procedural requirements or res judicata. We do not speculate as to the bounds or
propriety of pure prospectivity. Nor do we speculate about the remedy that may be
appropriate in this case . . . .”).
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party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that
would have been awarded if the rule had been an old one.”142
Finally, the Court again addressed the issue of retroactivity in
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation. 143 Harper involved a
Virginia statute that exempted retirement benefits paid by state and
local governments from taxation, but did not exempt retirement benefits
paid by the federal government.144 A similar Michigan statute was held
unconstitutional in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury.145 The
Virginia Supreme Court refused to apply the Davis decision to cases
brought by persons who had paid tax on federal retirement benefits
before Davis was decided. 146 On appeal, the high court decided that
Virginia had to give effect to the holding in Davis, but that did not
mean that the plaintiff taxpayers were entitled to refunds. 147 Rather, the
state was obligated to “provide relief consistent with federal due
process principles.”148 In the context of a decision where a state statute
attempted to levy an unconstitutional tax, the due process requirement
may be met by affording the taxpayer a “predeprivation hearing”
allowing the taxpayer to challenge the tax before paying it. In the
absence of such a remedy, the state must provide “backward-looking
relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation.”149
In the end, the Virginia Supreme Court decided that although
Virginia law did allow taxpayers to bring a declaratory judgment action
to review the constitutionality of laws imposing taxes, no taxpayer
would think that such an action provided the only remedy because
Virginia’s statute required refunds of illegally collected taxes. 150 The
declaratory judgment was not an adequate “predeprivation” remedy and
the taxes paid under the void statute had to be refunded.151
In Harper, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, recognized
that “Griffith and American Trucking . . . left unresolved the precise
extent to which the presumptively retroactive effect of this Court’s
decisions may be altered in civil cases.” 152 The Court then discussed

142.
Id. at 535.
143.
509 U.S. 86 (1993).
144.
Id. at 90–91.
145.
489 U.S. 803 (1989).
146.
Harper, 509 U.S. at 91.
147.
Id. at 100.
148.
Id. (quoting American Trucking Ass’n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 181
(1990)).
149.
Id. at 100 (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus. Regulation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990)).
150.
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 462 S.E.2d 892, 898 (1995).
151.
Id. at 899.
152.
Harper, 509 U.S. at 96.
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James Beam, finding that, while James Beam had not produced a
unified opinion, it had seen a majority of justices agree on a rule:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of
the rule.153
The Court, invoking Justice Stevens’s American Trucking dissent
and adopting a hard position reflecting a majority of the justices in
James Beam,154 elaborated:
Regardless of how Chevron Oil is characterized, our decision
today makes it clear that “the Chevron Oil test cannot
determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the
particular case” and that the federal law applicable to a
particular case does not turn on “whether [litigants] actually
relied on [an] old rule [or] how they would suffer from
retroactive application” of a new one.155
The Court then continued: “In both civil and criminal cases, we
can scarcely permit ‘the substantive law [to] shift and spring’ according
to ‘the particular equities of [individual parties’] claims’ of actual
reliance on an old rule and of harm from a retroactive application of the
new rule.”156
As Professor Tribe explains, in Harper, “[t]he Court expressly
endorsed the view of the dissent in American Trucking that ‘[t]he Court
has no more constitutional authority in civil cases than in criminal cases
to disregard current law or to treat similarly situated litigants
differently.’”157 Professor Tribe further explains, “[T]he Court did not
hold that all decisions of federal law must necessarily be applied
retroactively. . . . [T]he Court has not renounced the power to make its
decisions entirely prospective . . . .”158 Thus, while the Court appeared
hostile to non-retroactivity generally, Chevron Oil, which dealt with
pure prospectivity, was not in fact overruled.159 Instead, “the majority
153.
Id. at 97.
154.
Id.
155.
Id. at 95 n.9 (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S.
529, 543 (1991)).
156.
Id. at 97 (quoting James Beam, 501 U.S. at 543).
157.
TRIBE, supra note 81, at 226 (quoting Harper, 509 U.S. at 97).
158.
TRIBE, supra note 81, at 226.
159.
Kay, supra note 18, at 48.
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opinion forbade only ‘selective prospectivity,’ in which a court applies
the new rule to the parties before it but not to other conduct predating
the court’s judgment.”160
Through Harper, the Court had essentially created a presumption
of retroactivity. 161 “Left unclear,” Professor Pam Stephens suggests,
“are the circumstances under which such a presumption might be
overturned—when might the Court reserve such a determination, how
would the decision whether to afford retroactive application be made
(by what standard) and is pure prospectivity therefore still an
option.”162
Justice Breyer shed some light on the meaning of Harper in the
majority opinion of Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 163 a decision
issued by the Court in 1995.164 Hyde, an Ohio resident, was injured in
an accident involving a truck owned by an out-of-state company. 165
Although she brought her action after the two-year Ohio statute of
limitations had ran, the suit was still timely because under an Ohio
statute the statute of limitations is tolled while a person against whom a
cause of action accrues is out of the state.166 While Hyde’s action was
pending, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.167 that the Ohio tolling provision
violated the Commerce Clause and was unconstitutional. 168 After the
Ohio trial court and intermediate appellate court dismissed her case,
Hyde appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court which reinstated it, holding
that Bendix could not be applied retroactively to claims in state courts
that had “accrued” before the announcement of the Bendix decision.169
In a decision delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court unanimously
held that the federal Constitution does not permit this tolling to occur to
pre-Bendix torts.170 Plaintiff Hyde attempted to frame the issue of the
case not as one of retroactivity, but as one of remedy, when he tried to
persuade the Court that the tolling of the statute of limitations should be

160.
Id.
161.
Stephens, supra note 113, at 1559.
162.
Id.
163.
514 U.S. 749 (1995).
164.
Id.
165.
Id. at 751.
166.
Id.
167.
486 U.S. 888 (1988).
168.
Id. at 889.
169.
Reynolds Casket Co., 514 U.S. at 751–52.
170.
Id. at 750–51, 761 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Joining Justice Breyer
were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice
O’Connor joined. There was no dissent filed.).
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seen “as a state law ‘equitable’ device.” 171 The Court rejected the
notion that essentially prospective results could be achieved through
remedial means and declared that “we do not see how . . . the Ohio
Supreme Court could change a legal outcome that federal law,
applicable under the Supremacy Clause, would otherwise dictate simply
by calling its refusal to apply that federal law an effort to create a
remedy.”172 The Court thus concluded that the rule in Bendix should be
applied retroactively since the Bendix decision applied to the parties
then before the Court, and, following the reasoning of the Harper
decision, required that this rule also be applied to the Reynoldsville
Casket plaintiff, Hyde.173 Under the rule, when state courts apply a new
judge-made rule of federal law, the Supremacy Clause of the federal
Constitution requires that they apply such a rule retroactively.174
Justice Breyer also noted the “special circumstances” of tax cases
in which remedies other than refunds of unconstitutionally collected
taxes are possible. 175 For example in Harper, Virginia could have
refunded taxes collected from federal pensioners or imposed back taxes
on state and local pensioners. 176 Either would have satisfied the
constitutional requirements of equal protection. Justice Breyer also
noted that retroactivity can be defeated by another constitutionally
adequate rule. 177 Justice Breyer posited that “a pre-existing, separate,
independent rule of state law, having nothing to do with retroactivity—a
rule containing certain procedural requirements for any refund
suit—nonetheless barred” the refund suit.178
Ultimately, the Court held that state courts must give retroactive
effect to decisions of federal law unless special circumstances exist.179
The Court noted, however, that even where a new rule is applied
retroactively to pending cases, there may be “instances where that new
rule, for well-established legal reasons, does not determine the outcome
of the case.”180 Specifically, a court may find:
(1) [A]n alternative way of curing the constitutional violation,
or (2) a previously existing, independent legal basis (having
nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying relief, or (3) . . .

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 753.
Id. at 753–54.
Id.
Id. at 750–51, 754.
Id. at 755.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 758–59.
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a well-established general legal rule that trumps the new rule
of law, which general rule reflects both reliance interests and
other significant policy justifications, or (4) a principle of law
. . . that limits the principle of retroactivity itself.181

These limitations are not absolute in all civil litigation, however,
as “[i]n rare cases parties may collaterally attack otherwise final
judgments but only if the case is truly exceptional.”182 Both the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
express such an exception.183 The Court’s retroactive application of its
holdings has always been limited by both the preclusion doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata as well as by statutes of
limitations.184
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Mitchell,185 a Texas case on
retroactivity, Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Jefferson, in his
dissenting opinion (on unrelated grounds), says “the Supreme Court
explicitly overruled [the Chevron Oil test] as it applies to constitutional
decisions and suggested that prospective application was not only wrong
as to constitutional decisions, but contrary to the role of the
judiciary.” 186 Chief Justice Jefferson went on to note the concurring
opinion by Justice Scalia in Harper on the issue of retroactive versus
prospective application of decisions in which Scalia summarized the
Court’s position succinctly as follows: “Prospective decision making is
the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis.
. . . The true traditional view is that prospective decision making is
quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that courts have no
authority to engage in the practice.”187
Although the retroactivity doctrine in civil cases might lack
absolute clarity, in her article “The New Retroactivity Doctrine:
Equality, Reliance and Stare Decisis,” Professor Pam Stephens cites
four rationales which have underlined the retroactivity doctrine over the

181.
Id. at 759.
182.
Kay, supra note 18, at 51.
183.
Id. at 52. Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Section
73(2) of the Restatement both suggest the availability of the option to alter the finality
in civil litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
73(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1980). This must be for “particularly compelling reasons” and
“[a]t some point adjudication comes to an end and unsuccessful civil litigants are denied
the solace of newer and friendlier law.” Kay, supra note 18, at 52.
184.
Stephens, supra note 113, at 1568.
185.
276 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. 2008).
186.
Id. at 450.
187.
Id. at 451 (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105–
06 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted)).
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years. 188 Perhaps these rationales may provide us some guidance in
analyzing the aftermath of Obergefell, as these considerations may be
what ultimately sway the Court in the face of revising its own
doctrine.189
First, Stephens explains that notions of fairness, and, more
specifically, reliance largely supported Chevron Oil. 190 The same
concerns underlay American Trucking. 191 It was in Harper, however,
that fairness focused on reliance interest was superseded by fairness
focused on interests in equal treatment. 192 Second, Stephens explains
how the judiciary’s Article III powers—to decide cases and
controversies—have given way to constitutional objections to
prospectivity. 193 Of course, we have seen Justice Scalia oppose
prospectivity on these grounds, 194 but Stephens argues that “despite
Scalia’s arguments to the contrary, there is nothing in the text of Article
III which defines the nature of the judicial role, nor the exact limits of
the judicial power relative to the other branches.”195 Further, she points
out, prospective decision-making has been traditionally used in this
country; in fact, “the Court has suggested that such nonretroactive
application of law might be constitutionally required in some
instances.”196 Third, Stephens explains how stare decisis may provide a
certain rationale for retroactivity.197 While Scalia has argued that stare
decisis and non-retroactivity are essentially incompatible, Stephens
points out:
Proponents of some measure of prospectivity argue that in
fact the purposes of the doctrine of stare decisis are served by
not requiring retroactive application of all new rules. This is
so because underlying the doctrine of stare decisis is the
principle of protecting justifiable reliance upon established
law. To the extent that a party has justifiably relied upon
established law, and has no reason to anticipate a change in
that law, refusing to apply a new rule of law to that party is
consistent with stare decisis.198

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Stephens, supra note 113, 1560–68.
See generally id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1561. See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Stephens, supra note 113, at 1563.
Id.
Id. at 1563–64.
Id. at 1565.
Id.
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Stephens argues that it is indeed the “flexible application of the
doctrine of stare decisis,” or an application that allows for the sudden
abandonment of old rules where necessary, that “has allowed the law to
evolve gradually in this country, accommodating changes in modern
society, unrestricted by archaic rules.” 199 Finally, Stephens notes the
rationale of finality:
In the civil area, the Court has usually dealt with the issue of
finality implicitly, although it has on occasion stated its view
in more explicit terms. The Court seems to have assumed that
any retroactive application of its rulings is always limited by
both the preclusion doctrines and by statutes of limitations.
To the extent that a litigant is barred by collateral estoppel or
res judicata from raising a particular issue or mounting a
claim or defense, the litigant cannot take advantage of any
new rule announced by the courts. Similarly, should the court
announce a new rule of law that provides a cause of action
where one did not exist before, a litigant may not take
advantage of that to bring a case barred by the relevant statute
of limitations. Again, underlying both the preclusion
doctrines and statutes of limitations is in large part the notion
that there must be an endpoint to litigation or to the
possibility of litigation. In both the criminal and civil areas
then, finality acts to put an outside limit on the scope of the
retroactivity doctrine.200
Stephens writes:
[T]he new retroactivity doctrine is consistent with the Court’s
more conservative view of the narrow role of the judiciary
and the limits on the judicial power. By requiring judicial
decisions to have retroactive application, the assumption is
that courts will be less likely to overturn precedent—not
wanting to adversely affect those who relied upon the old
rule. Therefore, stare decisis will be more forcefully adhered
to and judicial activism diminished.201
In sum, when the Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and
must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct
review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 1567.
Id. at 1568.
Id.
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or postdate the announcement of the law. Therefore, in the aftermath of
Obergefell, it is undeniable that any precedent banning the recognition
of same-sex marriages has been overturned as an unconstitutional denial
of a fundamental right, and Obergefell should be applied purely
retroactively for choice-of-law purposes. Operating under this
assumption, we next turn to Trimble to provide an illustrative guide to
the issues that arise concerning remedial limitations when dealing with
familial relations, property, and retroactivity.
D. Trimble v. Gordon and Retroactive Inheritance Rights202
As courts begin to address how Obergefell will affect surviving
spouses, families, and third parties—such as purchasers, mortgagees,
and title insurers—Trimble v. Gordon203 and its progeny highlight the
unique challenges of retroactive applications of remedial considerations
to the state law legal disciplines of real property and property
succession. 204 These cases flesh out some of the remedial limitations
that will be of issue in post-Obergefell disputes, as seen as recently as
2004 in the case of Kau Agribusiness Co. v. Ahulau. 205 Although
insightful in highlighting the unique nature of real property and
property succession laws, it should be noted that Trimble was decided
before the Supreme Court’s recent development of a more robust
concept of retroactivity. Nevertheless, Trimble may still serve in
developing a framework for analyzing remedial issues concerning
Obergefell. A pattern of particular remedial problems begins to develop
202.
Although Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and its lineage may
seem like the obvious precedent for the retroactivity of civil marriage laws, Loving does
not make for the strongest analogy because Loving dealt primarily with penal statutes.
Retroactivity jurisprudence is bifurcated into two jurisprudential lines: criminal and
civil. See infra Part II.C. Resolving retroactivity issues concerning the Obergefell
decision will implicate the civil line of judicial retroactivity jurisprudence. While
Loving is a penal law case, it was the impetus for retroactive inheritance rights in at
least two cases. See Dick v. Reaves, 434 P.2d 295, 298 (Okla. 1967) (in the context of
an inheritance dispute, declaring an Oklahoma penal statute unconstitutional and
overruling all contrary prior decisions in accordance with Loving, thereby creating a
retroactive new class of heirs); Hibbert v. Mudd, 272 So. 2d 697, 700, 706 (La. Ct.
App. 1972) (Culpepper, J., dissenting) (noting that although the lower court relied on
Loving to invalidate a civil statute that banned miscegenous heirs from receiving their
inheritance, “the Loving case applied to a penal statute and there could be a question as
to whether it extends to civil statutes”), rev’d on other grounds, 294 So. 2d 518 (La.
1974).
203.
430 U.S. 762 (1977).
204.
Id.
205.
95 P.3d 613 (Haw. 2004). “After the application of Trimble to invalidate
their own similar statutes, other state courts addressing the prospective/retroactive
question have generally limited the retrospective reach of the statutory invalidation.”
Id. at 622–23 (quoting Williamson v. Gane, 345 S.E.2d 318, 320 (W. Va. 1986)).
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upon reviewing these cases, including whether estates have closed,
whether applicable statute of limitations have run, and whether property
has been transferred to innocent bona fide purchasers.
In Trimble, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional state statutes
that excluded a non-marital child from inheriting from the child’s
biological father. 206 Various states unsuccessfully defended these
statutes by claiming an interest in encouraging family relationships and
in establishing an accurate and efficient method of disposing of property
at death. The Court held that although a state has a great deal of
independence in determining how to govern the disposition of an estate,
the state is still bound by constitutional limits. 207 For a federal court,
“[t]he judicial task here is the difficult one of vindicating constitutional
rights without interfering unduly with the State’s primary responsibility
in this area.” 208 For cases dealing with proof of paternity, the Court
held that the difficulty in proving paternity was not so great as to justify
unilaterally denying the inheritance rights of illegitimate children whose
fathers died intestate.209 As one court noted, “a statutory classification
based on illegitimacy violates equal protection unless it is substantially
related to an important governmental interest.”210 The Court’s holding
in Trimble gave rise to numerous claims by non-marital children and
raised questions regarding Trimble’s retroactive effect on the intestacy
laws of the states.
1. RETROACTIVITY OF TRIMBLE
Before the Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of its
decision in Trimble, probate courts in different states reached various
conclusions concerning the extent, if any, of the retroactivity of Trimble
to property succession law. The Supreme Court of Appeals for West
Virginia applied Trimble retroactively in Williamson v. Gane, 211 an
intestate probate action concerning whether the decedent’s non-marital
children were beneficiaries of the estate. 212 At the time of the
decedent’s death, West Virginia law allowed non-marital children to
inherit only from their mother’s estate, and therefore the decedent’s

206.
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776.
207.
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771 (1977).
208.
Id.
209.
Id. at 772.
210.
Dickson v. Simpson, 807 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tex. 1991) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed Petitioner a fair opportunity to establish her kinship
because the harsh discrimination against non-marital children did not sufficiently further
the orderly administration of estates).
211.
345 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1986).
212.
Id. at 320.
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children were not deemed heirs at law. 213 Over two years after the
decedent’s death, however, the United States Supreme Court decided
Trimble. The sole question presented to the court in Williamson was the
retroactive effect, if any, of Trimble upon the devolution of title to the
intestate decedent’s real estate. 214 The court noted that the “United
States Supreme Court has not addressed the prospective/retroactive
question as it applies to the Trimble decision.”215 Regardless, the court
applied Trimble retroactively and acknowledged the non-marital
children as lawful heirs, finding that (1) there has been no justifiable
and detrimental reliance upon the law invalidated therein, (2) the
subject property has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for
value, or (3) the estate is subject to further administration. 216 The
Court’s definition of the Trimble test is significant here because it
establishes guidelines that are beyond the limitations of paternity; 217
these three criteria can be applied to any statute addressing the
distribution of an estate and the retroactivity of a holding.
Other state probate courts, however, reached alternative
conclusions to the retroactive/prospective question regarding Trimble.
For instance, the Supreme Court of South Carolina utilized a very
restrictive application in Wilson v. Jones.218 In Wilson, the court settled
upon a pure prospective application of Trimble by holding that only
those non-marital children whose fathers die after the date of the
Trimble decision may inherit.219 The Tennessee Supreme Court, on the
other hand, retroactively applied its own decision, holding that a nonmarital child can inherit from the child’s father so long as paternity is
proved “by clear and convincing evidence” and the other claimants
have not relied to their detriment on prior law (in this case the court
describes those other claimants as “merely assert[ing] that they have
passively acquired rights as the heirs at law of an intestate property

213.
Id. at 319.
214.
Id. at 320.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. at 322; see also Marshall v. Marshall, 670 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tenn.
1984) (“[R]etroactive application of a decision overruling an earlier decision ordinarily
is denied only if such an application would work a hardship upon those who have
justifiably relied upon the old precedent.”).
217.
Williamson, 345 S.E.2d at 322.
218.
314 S.E.2d 341 (S.C. 1984). See also Mitchell v. Hardwick, 374 S.E.2d
681, 682 (S.C. 1988) The South Carolina Supreme Court held that Trimble should be
given “limited retroactive application” where an innocent purchaser is not adversely
affected by enforcing the new rule in the face of the purchaser’s reliance on the law
existing at the time of the purchase, where paternity is “conclusively established,” and
where the estate administration is subject to “further resolution.” Id.
219.
314 S.E.2d at 343.
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owner,” not that they have relied on the prior law).220 Still, other courts
accorded limitations on the retroactive effect by applying Trimble to
matters pending on the date of the Trimble decision. 221 Finally, the
Supreme Courts of Kentucky222 and Arkansas223 refused to give Trimble
any retroactive effect.
Adding to the retroactive/prospective chaos following Trimble, the
United States Supreme Court deliberated the question in Reed v.
Campbell,224 a case concerning a decedent who died intestate when the
Texas Probate Code prohibited non-marital children from inheriting
from their biological father’s estate. 225 Subsequent to the decedent’s
death, the Court decided Trimble, thereby holding the Texas statute
void ab initio.226 After Trimble, a non-marital child of the decedent filed
a claim to a share in her father’s estate, but a Texas trial court denied
the claim. 227 The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
Trimble does not apply retroactively. 228 Despite this, the Supreme
Court of the United States applied Trimble retroactively in Reed and
held:
The interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in
avoiding unjustified discrimination against children born out
of wedlock, requires that appellant’s claim to a share in her
father’s estate be protected by the full applicability of
Trimble. There is no justification for the State’s rejection of
the claim. At the time appellant filed her claim, Trimble had
been decided, and her father’s estate remained open. Neither
the date of the father’s death nor the date appellant’s claim
was filed should have prevented the applicability of Trimble.
Those dates, either separately or in combination, had no

220.
See Marshall, 670 S.W.2d at 215 (citing Allen v. Harvey, 568 S.W.2d
829 (1978)) The Tennessee statute governing inheritance by non-marital from their
biological fathers was not as restrictive as the Illinois statute invalidated by Trimble
and, arguably, was not overturned by Trimble. Id.
221.
See Frakes v. Hunt, 583 S.W.2d 497 (Ark. 1979); In re Estate of Rudder,
397 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); In re Estate of Sharp, 377 A.2d 730 (N.J. Super.
1977), aff'd as modified, 394 A.2d 381 (N.J. 1978); Winn v. Lackey, 618 S.W.2d 910
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
222.
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Ky. 1978).
223.
Frakes, 583 S.W.2d at 499.
224.
476 U.S. 852 (1986).
225.
Id. at 852–53.
226.
Id. at 853.
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
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impact on the State’s interest in orderly administration of the
estate.229
2. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
Although a federal court’s decision may be given full retroactive
effect, remedial considerations may be affected by whether “cases [are]
still open on direct review.” 230 While this potential limit on the
retroactivity of remedies provides a level of certainty to persons whose
cases have reached a final point of adjudication, the limits also have
practical considerations by preventing a case from being reopened with
each subsequent change in the law.231
These rules may be overlooked in extraordinary cases where an
injustice will continue to be implemented if the decision is not revisited.
Section 73(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment “may be set aside or
modified if . . . [t]here has been such a substantial change in the
circumstances that giving continued effect to the judgment is unjust.”232
Despite the apparent wiggle room within the Restatement, the
limitations of retroactivity seem best recognized as being barred by
time: “retroactive effect of civil judgments reaches back only to
controversies still open to judicial resolution.”233
Although the Court’s decision in Reed resolved at least some of the
retroactivity issues raised by Trimble, the Court did emphasize that the
decedent’s estate had remained “open” at the time of the decision. 234
Therefore, “closed” estates may produce limitations concerning
retroactive remedial considerations. Of course, discerning the
differences between open and closed estates is not as easy as it might
seem. Most estates are probably never formally closed, in the sense that
the personal representative has accounted to the court, process has been
issued to those interested, and the court has issued a decree approving
the accounts and discharging the personal representative from further
liability.

229.
Id. at 856.
230.
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1993).
231.
Quatnum Res. Mgm’t, L.L.C. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 112 So. 3d 209,
217 (La. 2013) (denying the re-opening of a 1925 case based on a 1983 United States
Supreme Court decision, Mennonite Bd. Of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)).
232.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 73(2) (1982).This standard was
recognized as being an “unsound policy” in Comment (c), which perhaps can account
for the rareness with which it is used and recognized. Id. § 73(2), cmt. c. See also FED.
R. CIV. P. 60(b).
233.
Kay, supra note 18, at 52. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
234.
Reed, 476 U.S. at 854.
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3. STATUTES OF REPOSE

Another approach to dealing with the remedial retroactive
application of Trimble concerns statutes of repose. On July 1, 1981,
Mississippi amended its statute governing inheritance by non-marital
children to conform to the Trimble holding. 235 The amendment gave
non-marital children who claimed to be entitled to inherit from or
through the child’s birth father (and a birth father claiming to inherit
from or through his non-marital child), where the decedent died before
July 1, 1981, three years from that date to bring the claim. 236 In
essence, it served as a statute of repose that gives those whose interests
are affected by a change in the law a limited amount of time to bring
claims related to events that occurred before the change was
announced.
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the statute in In re Estate of
Kimble, 237 holding that the statute affords non-marital children equal
protection of the laws “while at the same time accomplish the legitimate
state interest of (1) avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims,
(2) the fair and just disposal of an intestate decedent’s property; and (3)
the repose of titles to real property.” 238 In subsequent cases, the
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed dismissals of suits brought within
the three-year period of the statute by persons claiming to be the nonmarital children of decedents who had died in 1958, 239 1969, 240 and
1977.241 It is important to note that this legislation gave three years to
bring claims—the length of time allocated before rights are terminated
and proper notice requirements could be outcome determinative in
whether statutes of repose are constitutional.
4. BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
The concerns of the Court in Mitchell, similarly to the concerns of
the Court in Trimble and Reed, recognized that some illegitimate
children of fathers who died intestate (here, analogous to the previously
unrecognized spouses of same-sex couples) were entitled to inheritance
rights when (1) the orderly settlement of estates, and (2) the
dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws were not
jeopardized. If these two standards were not met, then the state might
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (West 2016).
Id.
447 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1984).
Id. at 1283.
Berry v. Berry, 463 So. 2d 1031 (Miss. 1984).
Holloway v. Jones, 492 So. 2d 573 (Miss. 1986).
In re Estate of Smiley, 530 So. 2d 18 (Miss. 1988).
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have had a valid interest in not re-visiting estate distribution on the
grounds that the accurate, effective, and just distribution of estates
would be compromised.
In Collier v. Shell Oil Co.,242 the Mississippi Supreme Court held
that the rights of non-marital children in the estate of their fathers, who
had died intestate in 1955, could not prevail over the rights of bona fide
purchasers of mineral rights in land included in the intestate estate,
acquired before the date of the decision in Trimble. 243 This is a
completely defensible result and certainly seems to comport with the
limits on retroactivity set out less than a decade later in Justice Breyer’s
Reynoldsville Casket Co. opinion: the bona fide purchaser principle is
one of those principles which, in this particular context, can provide
finality and which may also be appropriately described as “a wellestablished general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law, which
general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant policy
justifications . . . .”244
Kau Agribusiness Co. v. Ahulau, was a case that examined the
retroactive implications of an unconstitutional ban on non-marital
children inheriting from the estates of their fathers pre-Trimble, against
the rights of innocent bona fide purchasers.245 The case involved a quiet
title action brought by the successor in interest to the original
purchasers of land that was part of a decedent’s estate who died
intestate in 1939. 246 The defendants in the quiet title action claimed
through their father, the decedent’s nephew. 247 The defendants were
descendants of the non-marital children of the nephew.248 The Hawaii
Supreme Court discussed the issues involved at length. The court
applied Trimble retroactively on the grounds that the affected parties
would thus be able to receive proper compensation; however, the estate
of the plaintiff’s father was not yet closed.249 The court decided that the
heirs of the non-marital child cannot succeed in the quiet title action
filed by the current property because the plaintiff is an “innocent
purchaser” and the proof of paternity of the ancestor through whom the
defendants claimed was “inconclusive.” 250 The court defined an
innocent purchaser as one who “by an honest contract or agreement,
purchases property or acquires an interest therein, without knowledge,
242.
243.
244.
original).
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

534 So. 2d 1015 (Miss. 1988).
Id. at 1019.
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 759 (1995) (emphasis
95 P.3d 613 (Haw. 2004).
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625.
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or means of knowledge sufficient to charge him in law with knowledge,
of any infirmity in the title of the seller.”251 The Hawaii Supreme Court
stated that because the estate of the uncle of the claimant’s father was
never probated, his estate is still “subject to further resolution”—that is,
it is still “open”—although he died in 1939.252
The Hawaii Supreme Court also discussed at length Mitchell v.
Hardwick,253 the South Carolina Supreme Court decision giving Trimble
“limited retroactive application” where an innocent purchaser is not
adversely affected by enforcing the new rule in the face of the
purchaser’s reliance on the law existing at the time of the purchase,
where paternity is “conclusively established,” and where the estate
administration is subject to “further resolution.” 254 The Hawaii
Supreme Court ultimately adopted the Mitchell criteria.255
While Trimble and its lineage highlight remedial limitations of
retroactivity to unique aspects of property and property succession
laws, these cases predate Harper, a time when the retroactivity
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court was less clear and less robust. It
should be noted, though, that the principle reason cited for limiting the
retrospective reach of Trimble was “to prevent chaotic conditions”
arising regarding real property titles256—an argument that many feel real
property bar members and title insurers are currently making in light of
Obergefell. Therefore, although a more robust concept has developed in
recent years, Trimble provides examples of problematic remedial issues
that are sure to arise in post-Obergefell disputes, especially when
property has been sold or transferred to bona fide purchasers.
E. U.S. v. Windsor and Retroactive Federal Rights for Some Same-Sex
Marriages
The Supreme Court’s invalidation of Section 3 of DOMA raised
the issue of whether same-sex spouses were deemed “married” under
federal law beginning on the date of the Windsor decision 257 or
retroactively to the dates of their actual marriages. For same-sex
251.
Id. (quoting Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, 985 P.2d 1045, 1056 (Haw.
1999)).
252.
Id. at 626.
253.
374 S.E.2d 681 (S.C. 1988).
254.
Id. at 681–83.
255.
Kau Agribusiness, 95 P.3d at 626.
256.
See, e.g., Frakes v. Hunt, 583 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Ark. 1979) The dissent
in Frakes is an excellent exposition of the state of the law at the time and clearly shows
the development of the trend that would culminate in Harper. Id.
257.
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2014) (holding that “DOMA is unconstitutional as
a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution”).
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spouses, Windsor significantly changed the landscape of federal tax
law, federal employee benefits law (including spousal protections under
ERISA), and their respective related regulations. More important for
this discussion, though, is that Windsor invoked retroactivity issues
concerning same-sex marriage in cases where one of the spouses had a
life event (such as a retirement, death, or divorce) prior to the Windsor
decision. Not surprisingly, courts applied the retroactivity doctrine as
espoused in Harper to post-Windsor disputes. Therefore, the recent
application of Windsor provides an analogous example of examining the
retroactivity of same-sex marriages post-Obergefell.
Post-Windsor, the IRS and Treasury Department were the first
to issue an applicable statement regarding the retroactivity of same-sex
marriage.258 The IRS and the Treasury jointly issued Revenue Ruling
2013-17 (along with two sets of Frequently Asked Questions), which
fleshed out some of the outstanding issues concerning same-sex
marriages from a federal tax law perspective (FAQs 10–15 cover health
benefits and 16–19 cover qualified plans). 259 First, the IRS held that
gender-specific terminology (e.g. “husband,” “wife,” etc.) in the
Internal Revenue Code should be interpreted in a gender neutral
manner in light of Windsor.260 While significant, this can be thought of
as a holding of convenience, forestalling the necessity of sweeping
258.
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. From a federal perspective,
retroactivity would affect, in part, filing joint income tax returns; claiming the marital
deduction for estate and gift tax purposes under Sections 2523 and 2056 of the Code;
gift splitting under Section 2513 of the Code; electing portability under Section
2010(c)(4) of the Code; same-sex spouse being automatically assigned to the same
generation of his or her spouse for GST purposes under Section 2651(c) of the Code;
using the reverse QTIP election; taking advantage of step-up in income tax basis under
Section 1014(b)(6) of the Code on both halves of the community property at the first
spouse’s death, including jointly owned property in the estate under Section 2040(b) of
the Code; applying grantor trust rules that are triggered by a spouse’s benefits or
control over a trust; not recognizing gains and losses on sales between spouses;
disclaiming certain interests in property while retaining other rights in the disclaimed
property under Section 2518 of the Code; naming the spouse as the beneficiary under a
qualified retirement account and allowing the spouse to roll over the benefits of a
deceased spouse’s IRA into the surviving spouses own IRA or into an inherited IRA
which provides distributions over the surviving spouse' life expectancy; eliminating
adverse tax consequences for the transfer of property pursuant to a marriage settlement
agreement and taking advantage of non-inclusion in taxable income of the employerpaid health insurance premiums for coverage of the employee’s same-sex spouse; and
recognized for purposes of employee benefit plans governed by ERISA.
259.
The Treasury Department recently issued final regulations that reflect the
holdings of Windsor, Obergefell, and Revenue Ruling 2013-17. The regulations define
terms in the Code describing the marital status of taxpayers for federal tax purposes. As
in the earlier proposed regulations (NPRM REG-148998-13), the final regulations
provide that the terms “spouse,” “husband,” and “wife” mean an individual lawfully
married to another individual, and the term “husband and wife” means two individuals
lawfully married to each other. T.D. 9785, 2016-38 C.B. 38, at 361.
260
Id.

914

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

changes to the Code to correct for gender-specific terminology. Second,
(and the most publicized portion) the IRS issued a ruling that, for
federal tax purposes, a couple would be considered married (or not)
based on the state of celebration—not the state of residence.261 Finally,
the IRS ruled that civil unions and domestic partnerships—even those
with rights concomitant to marriage—would not be considered
marriages for purposes of federal tax law. 262 Because the Supreme
Court held that DOMA section 3 was unconstitutional, the statute was
void ab initio and, accordingly, Revenue Ruling 2014-19 mandated that
the Windsor decision be applied retroactively for the purpose of filing
original, amended, and adjusted tax returns, or claims for certain
credits or refunds. 263 While the IRS and the Treasury Department
applied Windsor retroactively for federal tax purposes, the retroactive
application was limited to open tax years—basically same-sex spouses
could (but were not required to) go back three years and file amended
returns.264
On April 4, 2014, the IRS issued Notice 2014-19,265 explaining the
application of the Windsor decision and Revenue Ruling 2014-19 to
qualified retirement plans. The Notice states that any retirement plan
qualification rule that applies because a participant is married must be
applied equally to same-sex spouses.266 Qualified plans must reflect “the
outcome of Windsor as of June 26, 2013” or risk losing tax
qualification.267 Through September 16, 2013, though, a plan would not
lose its tax qualification for recognizing only same-sex participants
domiciled in states that recognized same-sex marriages. 268 After that
date, all plans must recognized same-sex marriages regardless of
whether the spouse’s state of domicile recognized same-sex
marriages. 269 The Notice also provided that if a plan does not define
“spouse” or “marriage” in a manner inconsistent with Windsor, an
amendment is not required but the plan must be operated in accordance
with the Notice.270 It should be noted that the Notice did not provide
relief from any claim that a same-sex spouse might bring asserting

261.
Id.
262.
Id.
263.
Id.
264.
Id. If protective elections had been made, of course, the time period
might be longer.
265.
Notice 2014-19, 2014-47 I.R.B. 979.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Id.
269.
Id.
270.
Id.
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rights to spousal benefits based on events that happened before June
2013.271
Although Notice 2014-19 did not address specific retroactive
relief, a few courts raised retroactivity issues concerning employee
benefits and required that benefits be provided on pre-Windsor events.
In Cozen O’ Conner, P.C. v. Tobits, 272 a district court applied
Windsor retroactively to allow the plaintiff to recover death benefits.273
Ms. Tobits and Ms. Farley were married in Canada in 2006.274 Farley
participated in her employer’s pension plan.275 She died in 2010 (preWindsor) and her employer refused to grant Tobits any survivor
benefits because the employer did not recognize Tobits as a surviving
spouse.276 The court determined that because the employee benefit plan
was an ERISA-qualified plan,277 and that the plan did not specifically
exclude same-sex spouses, then the language of the plan should be
construed in accordance with federal law. 278 The court held that,
according to Windsor, “spouse” encompassed same-sex couples for
federal purposes, and the court provided Todbits retroactive relief. 279
Therefore, if a participant or beneficiary has a claim for benefits under
the terms of a plan, and the plan can be read to provide spousal benefits
to same-sex spouses, that claim can still be brought even if it is based
on events prior to Windsor.280
In the health plan context, a Ninth Circuit panel awarded back pay
for the costs of health insurance to a former federal employee in
Oregon who had not been permitted to enroll her same-sex partner in
the federal employee’s health plan prior to Windsor. 281 It should be
noted, though, that the panel did not directly address retroactivity.282
271.
See id.
272.
No. 11–0045, 2013 WL 3878688 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2013).
273.
Id. at *4.
274.
Id. at *1.
275.
Id.
276.
Id.
277.
Id. at *3. The Internal Revenue Service Code and ERISA require benefit
plans to meet certain requirements to be qualified for tax preferences. Id. Because the
ERISA-eligible plan in Tobits was drafted in compliance with federal law and expressly
required the plan to be construed in compliance with federal law, Windsor provided the
federal interpretation of the term “spouse.” Id.
278.
Id. at *4.
279.
Id. at *4–5.
280.
Simply, although a plan did not have to recognize same-sex marriages
prior to the dates announced in Notice 2014-19, participants and beneficiaries may still
bring claims for spousal benefits and claims for violations of ERISA or the terms of a
plan, even if the claims are based on events prior to Windsor.
281.
In re Fonberg, 736 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2013).
282.
Id. A different case raising retroactivity issues involving the denial of
federal health benefits to same-sex spouses was filed, but settled in September 2015.
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A recent decision from California applied Windsor to an ERISA
plan based on events that predate Windsor. In Schuett v. FedEx
Corp.,283 a surviving same-sex spouse, whose partner died before the
Windsor decision, brought a claim against FedEx for survivor
benefits.284 FedEx filed a motion to dismiss and stated that at the time
of the spouse’s death FedEx’s ERISA plan explicitly defined “spouse”
to include only opposite-sex couples. 285 They argued that Windsor
should not be applied retroactively because there were special
circumstances that justified a departure from the retroactivity standard
announced in Harper. 286 The court denied the motion to dismiss and
stated that it was “not persuaded at this stage of the case and under the
facts alleged in the complaint that there is any basis for denying
retroactive application of Windsor.”287
In addition, “the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
granted an administrative claim for retroactive survivor benefits
brought by a surviving same-sex spouse of a federal employee who died
in 2011.” 288 The couple was married in 2008. 289 When the federal
employee died in 2011, the surviving spouse was denied benefits by
OPM based on DOMA.290 The surviving spouse filed a timely claim for
survivor benefits in 2014, arguing that OPM should not apply the
unconstitutional law in evaluating her claim, but rather should apply
Windsor retroactively. 291 OPM granted the claim, and the surviving
spouse received death benefits and a monthly annuity retroactive to the
death of the federal employee. 292 In June 2014, the United States
Attorney General issued a memo stating that “OPM has begun the
process of working with surviving spouses of federal employees and
annuitants who died prior to the Windsor decision to ensure that these
widows and widowers receive the benefits to which they would have

See Complaint, Hudson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 15-cv-01539 (N.D. Cal. filed
Apr. 3, 2015).
283. 119 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
284.
Id. at 1157–58.
285.
Id. at 1157.
286.
Id. at 1163.
287.
Id. at 1166.
288.
Teresa S. Renaker et al., Post-DOMA Employee Benefits Issues Affecting
Employees
in
Same-Sex
Marriages,
Civil
Unions,
and
Domestic
Partnership,
AMERICANBAR.ORG
(Oct.
14,
2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/am/2014/9a_postdoma.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW2C-RDBK].
289.
Id.
290.
Id.
291.
Id.
292.
Id.
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otherwise been entitled had DOMA not prohibited OPM from
recognizing their marriages.”293
The retroactive application of Windsor to same-sex marriages will
provide much needed guidance in analyzing the effects of Obergefell. It
should be kept in mind, though, that the Obergefell opinion announced
an extension of federal constitutional rights, which may be somewhat
different from the retroactive application of a decision invalidating a
statute such as that at issue in Windsor. Regardless, this would tend to
make an argument for a retroactive application even stronger following
Obergefell.
F. Precedents on Remedial Relief Concerning Unconstitutional
Discriminatory Acts
In addition to the review of retroactivity jurisprudence in civil
cases, a brief examination of remedial reliefs proffered by courts when
statutes have been held unconstitutional based upon discriminatory acts
provide insights to the issues raised in Obergefell. In the past, when the
Supreme Court has invalidated laws that discriminate against discrete
groups, such as African Americans and women, the Court has held
remedial relief must be crafted in order to restore the victims of
unconstitutional discrimination to the position that they would have
occupied but for the discrimination. 294 Accordingly, these precedents
are important to any discussion concerning remedies in post-Obergefell
disputes.
For instance, in United States v. Virginia, 295 the Supreme Court
applied this type of remedial relief to a class of persons that are subject
to intermediate scrutiny, that being women.296 In fact, this application
was explicitly pointed out by Justice Scalia in his dissent.297 In United
293.
Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to The President of
The United States, Implementation of United States v. Windsor (June 20, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9722014620103930904785.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PE7T-LX5S].
294.
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996) (the Court held
that remedies “must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity
or advantage in ‘the position they would have occupied . . .’”) (quoting Milliken, 433
U.S. at 280); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279–80 (1977) (noting that, in
enforcing Brown v. Board of Education, courts were not limited to prospectively
stopping the discriminatory actions, but could also fashion remedies to undue the effects
of the prior discriminatory actions); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154
(1965) (“[T]he court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which
will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future.”).
295.
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
296.
Id. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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States v. Virginia, the Court struck down the Virginia Military
Institute’s male-only admission policy.298
In prophylactic response to the inequality, Virginia proposed a
matching program exclusively for women called the Virginia Women’s
institute for Leadership. 299 The Court did not find this proposal
remedial enough, as it would not restore the victims of the
discrimination, women, to a place they would have occupied but for the
unconstitutional discrimination. 300 Specifically, the proposal did not
provide women with the same type and standard of military training or
advancements that Virginia Military Institute provided for its male
counterparts.301 United States v. Virginia serves as a strong example of
the Courts’ eagerness to specifically strike down unconstitutional laws
and provide for restorative measures despite the facts of the case
lacking a heightened or strict scrutiny foundation. In fact, that
eagerness to strike absent a strict scrutiny basis is latently pointed out in
the dissenting opinion written by Justice Scalia.302
After the opinion, the Virginia Military Institute contemplated
bypassing the ruling by making the school private. 303 Had this
hypothetical materialized, the Department of the Defense would have
removed all ROTC programs. 304 This threat from the Department of
Defense caused Congress’ knee-jerk reaction to prevent the military,
through legislative amendment, from removing any ROTC programs
from a military college. 305 The political crossfire was for naught,
however, as the Virginia Military Institute’s Board voted to admit
women to the school.306
Although the application of this type of remedial relief traditionally
applies to classes that receive heightened scrutiny, the application of
remedial relief may apply even to classes that do not traditionally
receive heightened scrutiny. 307 Furthermore, courts have become
increasingly more likely to apply a heightened scrutiny to same-sex
couples and grant them broad remedial relief.308 As the Court stated in
its opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, “class-based legislation directed at
298.
Id. at 519.
299.
Id. at 526.
300.
Id. at 547.
301.
Id. at 548–49.
302.
Id. at 570–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
303.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Unconstitutionally Male?: The Story of United
States v. Virginia 32–34 (Duke Law Working Papers, Paper No. 12, 2010),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/working_papers/12/ [https://perma.cc/NKC6-EH3F].
304.
Id. at 34.
305.
See 10 U.S.C. § 2111a(3)(d) (2012).
306.
Bartlett, supra note 303, at 33.
307.
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889–90 (Iowa 2009).
308.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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homosexuals [is] a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”309 Indeed,
the Lawrence Court noted that the Texas statute in question directly
targeted homosexual individuals and had the effect of making
homosexuality a crime.310 The Court used the exclusivity of the law to
homosexual individuals to distinguish it from Bowers v. Hardwick,311
where the law in question applied equally to all groups and therefore
avoided Equal Protection analysis. 312 Therefore, the Court asked a
different question than was asked in Bowers: “whether, under the Equal
Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to
justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not
heterosexual sodomy. It is not.” 313 Thus, the Court concluded that,
“[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause.” 314 In addition, in Varnum v.
Brien,315 the Supreme Court of Iowa held that sexual orientation was a
quasi-suspect class and applied heightened scrutiny in analyzing it. 316
The court found that the Iowa civil marriage statute failed to provide
equal protection of the law and granted the plaintiffs the remedy they
requested.317 In Griego v. Oliver,318 the Supreme Court of New Mexico
applied intermediate scrutiny to a same-sex couple because the
legislation at issue “affect[ed] a sensitive class” rather than a suspect
class. 319 In Love v. Beshear, 320 a Kentucky district court found that
“homosexual persons constitute a quasi-suspect class,” and applied
heightened scrutiny.321
While the aforementioned cases are distinct in that they do not
apply retroactive relief, they do serve as guiding precedents and display
courts’ growing propensity to apply heightened scrutiny and afford
broad relief to same-sex couples. In the wake of Obergefell, we can
expect courts to place a much higher value on affording broad relief to
same sex couples, and that broad relief is likely to include the remedial
relief commonly afforded to discrete classes.

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 574.
Id. at 582.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582.
Id.
Id. at 582–83.
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
Id. at 889–90.
Id.
316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013).
Id. at 879.
989 F. Supp. 2d 539 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
Id. at 547.
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III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF OBERGEFELL322

By building upon the prior discussion concerning the applicable
jurisprudence of the doctrine of retroactivity in regards to
unconstitutional civil statutes, this Article introduces a normative
analysis of the retroactive application of Obergefell to pertinent state
law issues concerning real property and property succession laws. 323
Although the Supreme Court provides no guidance concerning the
retroactive nature (or limitations) of its decision in Obergefell, the
Supreme Court’s current retroactivity jurisprudence and the analogous
precedents discussed above will provide a predictive analysis of how
Obergefell will be applied retroactively.
A. Obergefell’s Retroactive Application as a Choice-of-Law Rule
Returning to the Article’s opening question of when do previously
unrecognized, but otherwise lawful, same-sex marriages begin: they
322.
Although I originally spoke on these issues in January 2014 during a
speech at Heckerling, many ideas and thoughts in this section of the Article evolved
over many discussions, emails, and presentations with Assoc, Dean William P.
LaPiana. See generally Tritt, Because it Wasn’t Complicated Enough, supra note 1.
Over the past few years, Dean LaPiana and I together have made numerous
presentations concerning real-world issues arising from Windsor and Obergefell.
Dean LaPiana has also written on some of these issues and some of these issues are
reflected in this section. For further reading, see William P. LaPiana, Married SameSex Couples Living in Non-Recognition States: A Primer, 7 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY
PROP. L.J. 417–73 (Summer 2015).
323.
From a federal perspective, Windsor already leveled the playing field for
same-sex spouses. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). Therefore
this Article will focus on states’ real property and property succession issues. It should
be noted, though, that Obergefell has helped simplify plan administration by providing
nationally uniform marriage access and recognition. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2608 (2015). In addition, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has evolved
their position on retroactivity in the wake of Obergefell. On August 20, 2015, the
Department of Justice announced that, for purposes of Social Security Benefits, the
SSA would recognize the marriage of surviving spouses of valid same-sex marriages.
Jonathan Adams, SSA Tells Court it Will Apply Obergefell Retroactively to Grant
Spousal Benefits in Lambda Legal Case, LAMBDA LEGAL (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/us_20150820_ssa-apply-obergefell-retroactivelyspousal-benefits [https://perma.cc/7R9Q-A7PN]. The SSA stipulated that it would only
recognize the marriages retroactively if the claim was already pending, and if the samesex couple resided in a state where their marriage was not recognized at the time of the
deceased spouse’s death. Id. This decision, which to date has not been reflected in the
SSA’s official publications, applies the Obergefell holding retroactively in the sense that
claims will now be accepted so long as they were pending on the date of the Obergefell
decision. Moreover, since the Windsor decision, the SSA has encouraged surviving
spouses of same-sex marriages to apply for benefits “right away.”
Important
Information
for
Same-Sex
Couples,
SOCIALSECURITY.GOV,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/people/same-sexcouples/
[https://perma.cc/W4THQRXA] (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
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definitely began on the date of their marriage, not on the date of the
Obergefell decision. It is clear that the Court’s judicial pronouncements
are retroactive in nature “to all events, regardless of whether such
events predate or postdate [the] announcement of the rule,”324 especially
concerning disputes involving fundamental rights. Moreover, fairness
focused on reliance interests should not supersede fairness focused on
interests of equal treatment of fundamental rights. As Justice Thomas
wrote in Harper, “the federal law applicable to a particular case does
not turn on ‘whether [litigants] actually relied on [an] old rule [or] how
they would suffer from retroactive application’ of a new one.” 325
Therefore, substantive law should not shift according to claims of
reliance on an old rule that deprived people of a fundamental right.
Obergefell, then, should be applied purely retroactively in the sense that
it applies to all cases still pending on direct review, and also to conduct
occurring prior to the date of the Obergefell decision. This follows the
application of the retroactivity doctrine as expressed, developed, and
applied in Harper and later related cases.
In addition, although many of these post-Obergefell disputes will
involve state law issues, it is clear that federal retroactivity
jurisprudence is applicable to these disputes. In general, state law
governs property and property succession laws. Therefore, many of the
post-Obergefell disputes may be litigated in state courts—and the high
courts of various states may have developed their own retroactivity
jurisprudence applicable to their decisions. The Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution, however, dictates that state courts
should apply the property implications of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Obergefell retroactively. 326 Simply, the effect of Obergefell is a
matter of federal constitutional law, and any particular views held by
state courts regarding the retroactive application of state decisions
becomes irrelevant. Although state courts have begun litigating many of
the retroactive issues concerning property in the wake Obergefell, the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the retroactivity of its decision is
germane and appropriate for our exploration.
It is clear that Obergefell should be applied retroactively for
choice-of-law considerations. The retroactive effect of Obergefell may
be limited, however, in the sense that independent principles of law
may restrict the relief that a court may provide. Therefore, an analysis
of Obergefell’s application for remedial considerations is in order.
324.
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
325.
Id. at 95 n.9 (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S.
529, 543 (1991)).
326.
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 753–54 (1995) (noting
that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution requires states to apply such rules
retroactively); see also Harper, 509 U.S. at 100; Kay, supra note 18, at 50.
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B. Obergefell’s Retroactive Applications as a Remedial Principle
Obergefell should be applied retroactively for remedial
considerations as well. The retroactive application of judicial decisions
concerning remedial matters, however, is complicated. First, the Court
acknowledged in Reynoldsville Casket Co. that there could be multiple
ways in which to fashion remedies while satisfying the constitutional
requirements of equal protection.327 Second, the Court has recognized
potential limitations concerning the retroactive application of remedial
matters, and that the Chevron Oil factors could apply in determining the
limitations of remedial principles limitations (not choice-of-law
matters). 328 The Court has also expressed concerns that retroactive
application of remedial principles might implicate notions of fairness
concerning the finality of litigation and harm arising from transfers of
property to innocent bona fide purchasers.329 Adequate remedies may be
fashioned, though, that protect both the victims of the now
unconstitutional discriminatory acts and the innocent third parties.
First, issues may arise if the estate’s property was distributed prior
to Obergefell. This should not pose a substantial problem, however,
because probate courts in certain states can “claw back” and
redistribute the property to the rightful heirs. This isn’t a novel
concept. Probate courts have a history of “clawing-back” improper
distributions. 330 Further, the Uniform Probate Code authorizes the
redistribution of improperly distributed property. Uniform Probate
Code section 3-909 states that an individual who receives improperly
distributed property “is liable to return the property improperly
received . . . .”331 Even if the distribution was authorized at the time it
was made, the distribution may still be considered improper under
states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code.332 Jurisdictions that
have not adopted the Uniform Probate Code may have different rules
governing the recovery of improperly distributed property. 333 For
327.
514 U.S. at 758–59.
328.
Id. at 758–59.
329.
Id. at 757–58.
330.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Zaritsky, 12 P.3d 1203, 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that the probate court had the authority to order the creditor to
relinquish improperly distributed property to the estate); Keul v. Hodges Blvd.
Presbyterian Church, 180 So. 3d 1074, 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that
the trial court had the authority to order the testator’s former caregiver to return funds
obtained through undue influence); In re Estate of Vernon, 637 So. 2d 365, 367 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that improperly distributed property may be returned to
the state as long as the limitations period has not expired).
331.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-909 (amended 2010).
332.
Id. at cmt.
333.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 733.812 (2016) (“A distributee or a claimant who
was paid improperly must return the assets or funds received, and the income from
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example, Washington, D.C. allows for the recovery and redistribution
of improperly distributed property within one year of the initial
distribution, while Arizona and Wisconsin permit recovery of
improperly distributed property within three years after the decedent’s
death or one year after the time the property was distributed. 334
Regardless of the jurisdictional nuances, the ability to “claw back” and
redistribute improperly distributed property is a tool available to many
probate courts.
Second, should the administrative convenience of finality trump
the concerns of those denied a fundamental right? The Supreme Court
has expressed concern over the seemingly unlimited retroactive liability
for actions taken in reliance on laws that were subsequently deemed to
be unconstitutional. 335 To this effect, the Court has been careful to
explain the need for finality in certain circumstances, and has
recognized possible limitations regarding remedial considerations in
cases involving res judicata, statutes of limitation, and laws requiring
parties aggrieved by law to provide timely notice of their objection.336
The desire for finality, though, must be balanced against harm
caused by the deprivation of fundamental rights under unconstitutional
discriminatory statutes. As discussed earlier, where the Supreme Court
has invalidated laws that discriminate against discrete groups of
those assets or interest on the funds since distribution or payment, unless the
distribution or payment cannot be questioned because of adjudication, estoppel, or
limitations. If the distributee or claimant does not have the property, its value at the
date of disposition, income thereon, and gain received by the distributee or claimant
must be returned.”); see also In re Estate of Vernon, 608 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (“Defendants in estate administrator's suit seeking to establish that
stock in defendant's name was in reality decedent's were not ‘distributees’ of property
of estate under probate code section addressing improper distribution and liability of
distributees, so as to subject them to less restrictive method of service of process
provided in code; to use section in question would assume very fact sought to be
litigated as jurisdictional base for probate court.”); Keul, 180 So. 3d at 1074 (Trial
court had authority to order testator's former caregiver to return funds former caregiver
had obtained through her payable-on-death designation on testator's credit union
accounts, which designation had been obtained through undue influence and was
invalid, to testator's estate); In re Estate of Vernon, 637 So. 2d at 366 (If, as alleged,
check for additional stock was written on date of decedent's death and check was
negotiated and stock was received after decedent's death by secured creditor which held
previous shares of the same stock as collateral for a loan, stock would be estate asset,
subject to suit by administrator for return of improper distribution. “Statute of
limitations on action by administrator to recover alleged improper distribution did not
begin to run until discovery of deficiency of assets to pay debts, even though suit
concerned payment to a creditor rather than a beneficiary”).
334.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1303 (2016) (effective Mar. 24, 1998); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3936 (2016) (effective Jan. 1, 1974); WIS. STAT. § 865.14
(2013–14).
335.
Reynolds Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 749 (1995).
336.
Id. at 756.
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victims, the Court has fashioned relief to make the victims whole.337 As
has been noted, “the court has not merely the power but the duty to
render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in
the future.” 338 Therefore, remedial measures should be applied in a
manner that places formally unrecognized same-sex spouses in the same
position that they would have been but for the unconstitutional
discriminatory act.
In addition, a state’s interest in finality may be less applicable in
post-Obergefell disputes. The earliest possible same-sex marriage dates
back merely to 2004.339 Because of this extremely limited time period,
the number of affected people is too small to cause an undue
administrative burden for states.
Also, statutes of limitation may not have been implicated because
many property transfers in post-Obergefell disputes will have passed by
matter of law (such as community property or homestead), and will
have been outside the realm of probate or the laws of decent and
distribution. 340 Therefore, many of the parties would not have been
given proper notice and statutes of limitation would not have run
because the property would not have been transferred by judicial
decisions or actions that would begin the tolling of statutes of
limitation.
Third, should remedial applications of Obergefell impede a third
party bona fide purchaser’s reliance on then law? There are serious
concerns involving notions of fairness concerning transfers of property
to innocent bona fide purchasers.
Therefore, a more critical analysis of remedial considerations
needs to be taken in these areas. Accordingly, this Article will now
proceed to examine retroactive remedies in the context of two areas of
state law: real property and property succession law. Both of these
state-law-governed areas require an examination of estate
administration, homestead, community property, and tenancy-by-theentirety rights to determine equitable remedies for affected parties.341
337.
See supra, Part II.F.
338.
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
339.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
340.
E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201A–3-101A (amended 2010).
341.
Although parentage issues are beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth
mentioning that parentage issues are heavily implicated in the context of Obergefell’s
retroactivity. For example, assume that a woman married to another woman conceives
through artificial insemination using anonymously donated sperm and gives birth. The
couple resides in a state that does not recognize their marriage. If second parent
adoption is available in the state, one would hope that the other spouse has adopted the
child, although that is likely not an option. If they are in a jurisdiction where the child
is considered a child of both spouses due to the existence of the marriage, has the child
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1. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION342
One lesson to be drawn from the aftermath of Trimble is that the
status of a surviving same-sex spouse as heir of a decedent who died
before Obergefell is greatly dependent upon whether the decedent’s
estate was still “open” on the date of the Obergefell decision. The
Court’s decision in Reed seems to provide some precedent regarding
the resolution of at least some of the issues that would be raised by
retroactively applying Obergefell to the estates of decedents who lived
in non-recognition states at the time of their deaths. 343 Surviving
spouses of decedents who died before June 26, 2015 should be able to
claim the status of heir to the decedent’s estate if the decedent’s estate
is still “open.”
In our prior example from the introduction, it is easy to determine
which survivors should claim the status of heirs to Thelma’s estate. The
estate is still open, therefore, Louise and J.D. are Thelma’s lawful
heirs. The mother has no standing because she is not an heir.
Unfortunately, the term “open” estate isn’t as definitive as it
sounds. In fact, most estates are probably never formally closed in the
sense that the personal representative has accounted to the court,
process has been issued to those interested, and the court has issued a
decree approving the accounts and discharging the personal
been the child of both spouses from birth or only from the date of judicial decision that
invalidated the state’s ban on same-sex marriage? In this case, retroactive application of
Obergefell is not difficult. The child will benefit from having two parents from birth
and the case may very well be decided by the classic “best interests of the child”
standard. However, what if the couple has separated before the date of Obergefell, or
even divorced, and the spouse who did not give birth was held not to be a parent? Does
that result now change? Answers will come through legislation, or more likely,
litigation. In the wake of Obergefell, courts need to recognize the marital presumption
(in states where it exists) in the context of same-sex marriage. A retroactive recognition
of the marital presumption should be implicit in the constitutional rights recognized and
codified by Obergefell and should take precedent over any estate issues that might arise.
342.
The purpose of the law of succession is that, in a private property system,
there must be a procedure to facilitate the transfer of an individual’s private property.
American society has long recognized the value in protecting an individual’s ability to
acquire and transfer property. The principle of donative freedom, the governing
principle underlying American succession law, provides that individuals have the
freedom to control the disposition of their property at death. Effectuating donative
intent is the hallmark of property succession law. Any succession law disputes that arise
from Obergefell should be viewed through this lens. For a discussion concerning the
importance of the principle, see Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated
Functionally Based Approach to Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV.
367, 374–79 (2009). See also Lee-ford Tritt, Dispatches from the Trenches of
America’s Great Gun Trust Wars, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 752–54 (2014); Lee-ford
Tritt, The Limitations of An Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2579, 2587–88, 2598–2601 (2011).
343.
Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986).
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representative from further liability. An estate may be considered
“closed” when the final assets of the estate are distributed, which
normally means that the Executor has no further work to perform.344
An estate may be considered “open” as long as the applicable statutes
of repose have not run, or if there is no final resolution of the issues
involved in the distribution of the decedent’s estate. Further
complications arise because proper notice may not have been given to
same-sex spouses during probate in violation of due process
jurisprudence.
However, even if Thelma’s estate had been “closed,” that would
not be the end of the road for Louise and J.D. Estates can be re-opened
under special circumstances. Though these special circumstances vary
by state, there are some commonalities throughout the country, such as
fraud, procedural irregularities, bad faith, manifest error, and equity.345
Of course, whether or not an estate is subject to further
administration clearly affects the “orderly and just distribution of a
decedent’s property at death.” 346 Although courts traditionally give
weight to the argument that a state needs to be able to efficiently
distribute and close a decedent’s estate, this is not necessarily
conclusive in and of itself. As noted in Trimble, “inheritance rights can
be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or
the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.”347
In Trimble and its lineage, the issue was whether or not the question of
paternity could be accurately satisfied (necessary to determine whether
the Contestant was in fact entitled to a share of the estate). In the
population of same-sex marriages, the question of marriage is much
344.
In California, the closing of an estate will be considered once all debts
have been paid or adequately provided for and the personal representative has filed an
account and petition for the final distribution of the estate with the relevant probate
court. CAL. CIV. PRAC. PROBATE & TR. PROCEEDINGS § 21:41 (2016). Final distribution
and closing of an estate in California is governed by the California Probate Code. See
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 12200–12202 (West 2015-16). In Florida, an estate may be closed
once the personal representative has completed the administration and distribution of an
estate. See also FLA. STAT. §§ 733.801–.901(1) (2016). The soonest an estate may be
closed in Massachusetts is six months. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 3-1003(a)
(2016). A personal representative must ensure that (1) the time in which creditors may
bring a claim against decedent’s estate has expired; (2) the estate has been fully
administered and the assets distributed; and (3) a copy of the personal representative’s
statement to close the estate has been sent to all distributes or creditors of the estate. Id.
345.
Florida case law only permits the reopening of an estate after the
discharge of the personal representative where there were procedural irregularities or
facts constituting fraud or bad faith. See Liechty v. Hall, 687 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997). Similarly, if an estate in Massachusetts was closed and involved “fraud or
manifest error,” then the estate will be reopened. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B,
§ 3-1003(b) (2016).
346.
Reed, 476 U.S. at 855.
347.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1997).
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more conclusive, and easily resolved, than the requirement of proof of
paternity. “After an estate has finally been distributed, the interest in
finality may provide an additional, valid justification for barring belated
assertion of claims” from newly recognized beneficiaries. 348 Thus,
justice for a same-sex spouse that was denied marital property rights
must be weighed against the state’s interest in the finality of
distributions of estate.
Unlike in Trimble, though, the fact that Obergefell announced an
extension of federal constitutional rights (not merely invalidating a state
statute) could play heavily in weighing competing policy issues,
including whether to reopen estates for those same-sex surviving
spouses who were deprived of property rights, proper notice, and due
process.349 The double injustice to these surviving spouses—first, being
unconstitutionally unrecognized, and second, being denied their rights
under property succession law—is an extremely unjust outcome.
Though some states will argue reliance upon existing law or undue
administrative burden, these arguments have become weaker at some
temporal point over the last decade and a half. DOMA and the first
Baby DOMAs350 began in 1996—not a very long period of reliance to
overcome the unjust nature of the deprivation of property rights.
Moreover, the first state to recognize same-marriage did so in 2004,351
and as more states began to recognize same-sex marriage, the reliance
argument becomes weaker. As for the undue burden argument, it
should be noted that the pertinent time period is relatively short (from
2004 until the Obergefell decision in 2015) and only a small number of
lawfully married same-sex couples moved to non-recognition states
during that time period. 352 Therefore, it is unlikely that the burden
would be overwhelming.
a. Testacy Estates
If the estate is deemed “open,” the status of the surviving samesex spouse as heir must be recognized. There are two retroactive issues
in regards to the testate estate of a deceased spouse of a same-sex
marriage who might have died in a non-recognition state before
Obergefell.353 First, the surviving spouse should be entitled to his or her
elective share if in a separate property state or his or her community

348.
349.
350.
351.
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Reed, 476 U.S. at 855.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
See supra note 39.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
See American Community Survey Data on Same Sex Couples, supra note
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See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
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property share if in a community property state. 354 Second, if the
decedent was not survived by any descendants, then the surviving
spouse is most likely the sole heir. 355 Such a situation precludes
collateral relatives from claiming rights in the estate and negates their
standing to challenge the will.
In our example, if Thelma had a duly executed will that left
everything to Louise but Thelma’s mother challenged the will before
the Obergefell decision, Thelma’s mother would have standing in a
non-recognition state because the mother would be deemed the heir at
law (J.D. might have standing, though, as the next lawful heir). If the
will has not yet been admitted, and litigation or preparation for
litigation has only begun, then Obergefell must be given retroactive
effect. Louise will be recognized as the surviving spouse on the date of
the decedent’s death even though it occurred before June 26, 2015, and
the litigation must conclude because Thelma’s mother no longer has
standing as heir. If the litigation had already been decided but the time
for appeal has not run, Louise should prevail as well.356 But what if the
will had already been admitted through a settlement of the parties prior
to Obergefell? Can the settlement be undone if recognition means that
Thelma’s mother now does not have standing? Assuming the court has
approved the settlement, it may be impossible to undo. If the will was
denied probate because the mother prevailed, it may be equally
impossible to undue that decree, although a court in equity probably
could rule on the loss of standing even after the action has been
resolved. If the time for appeals had not lapsed, Louise may have a
stronger argument. This result may not be easy to accept if the will was
denied probate, mainly because the mother objecting to probate should
not have had standing to do so. Unfortunately, if there are any remedies
at all for the surviving same-sex spouse, they may be very limited if the
litigation process was completed before Obergefell.

354.
Id.
355.
Id.
356.
If the challenge is coming from people who would be heirs even if the
marriage were recognized, most likely descendants of the decedent, the case would
continue, but with the surviving spouse in a much better position, not only as heir, but
also entitled to community property or the elective share.
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b. Intestacy Estates357
The meaning of “open” is even murkier in intestate estates than in
testate estates. For instance, in the Mississippi cases discussed above,
the court seemed to imply that property (at least real property) passed
automatically in intestacy without formal probate proceedings. 358 The
courts discussed the lack of “probate” in the estates of the long-ago
deceased alleged paternal ancestors.359 The courts in Marshall and Kau
Agribusiness contrasted “passive” reliance on the intestacy statute with
reliance on a court proceeding in determining the alleged paternal
ancestor’s heirs.360 The courts’ holdings, though, seem understandable
in that, traditionally at least, real estate passes from the deceased
titleholder to that person’s heirs “automatically” without any need for
administration of the estate. But, there is another reason: land can
always be found. Personal property may have been sold and its
proceeds difficult to trace. Presumably, the now recognized surviving
spouse could assert a claim to real estate that was part of the intestate
estate of the deceased spouse even if no formal probate proceedings
were held relating to the decedent’s estate.
2. REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, COMMUNITY PROPERTY, AND
HOMESTEAD ISSUES
One conclusion that certainly seems indisputable is that the rights
of the retroactively recognized spouse will not trump the rights of bona
fide purchasers of property. This is a completely defensible result and
certainly seems to comport with the limits that the bona fide purchaser
principle placed on retroactivity in Reynoldsville Casket Co. The bona
fide purchaser principle, which may be appropriately described as “a
well-established general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law,
which general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant
policy justifications,” 361 is one of those principles which can provide
finality in this particular context. The application of the bona fide
357.
Given the interplay between the law of intestacy and the law of wills, it
would seem evident that the purpose, the principle, and the policy behind the creation
of rules governing intestacy should theoretically coincide with the policy goals of the
law of wills: each represent a different side of the same coin—the law of succession.
Some scholars disagree on this point. For a discussion concerning this dialogue on the
jurisprudence of laws of wills and laws of intestacy, see Lee-ford Tritt, Technical
Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform
Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 280–86 (2010).
358.
See supra Part II.D.3–4.
359.
See supra Part II.D.3–4.
360.
Marshall v. Marshall, 670 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. 1984); Kau Agribusiness
Co. v. Heirs of Assigns of Ahulau, 95 P.3d 613 (Haw. 2004).
361.
Id. at 759.
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purchaser principle will probably resolve most claims involving real
property in situations where now-recognized spouses have spousal
rights in property that would have normally been conveyed to bona fide
purchasers or has already been conveyed to such purchasers. At least to
the extent real estate is involved,362 situations like this are most likely
resolved by leaving the bona fide purchaser in possession of the
property. However, proceeds of the sale of the property to the bona
fide purchaser should be handled differently. The proceeds of sale
should be traced through the estate (or the transferor) in order to satisfy
any community property rights, homestead rights, or other marital
property rights to which the previously unrecognized same-sex spouse
now has legal right.
a. Homestead Rights
In many states, homestead rights are granted to a surviving spouse
(and, in some states like Florida, to minor children as well). 363 The
homestead is not devisable—the surviving spouse has a vested property
interest. In states where homestead property has a robust protection
from creditor claims, does the spouse who held title before state
recognition of the marriage still have legal rights to the home even
though the state must now recognize the other spouse’s rights in the
homestead?364
Let’s change our example: Louise, Thelma, and J.D. moved to
Florida instead of Texas. When they moved to Florida, Thelma bought
a home with her own proceeds and then died without a will. After
Thelma’s death, Louise wants to sell the home but Louise’s mother
wants the home under Florida’s intestacy statutes. Pre-Obergefell,
Louise will not be deemed a spouse under Florida law. J.D. may not be
deemed to be Louise’s child because Louise never adopted him and

362.
And probably with regard to all property.
363.
In Florida, if a decedent is survived by a spouse and minor children, no
devise of homestead is permitted; rather, the surviving spouse receives a life estate and
the children receive a vested remainder interest. If all of the children are adults, the
only permissible devise is a fee simple interest to the surviving spouse. See FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
364.
The problem in Florida is particularly acute. The Florida constitution
allows the alienation of “homestead real estate by mortgage, sale or gift” only with the
consent of the owner’s spouse, if the owner is married. Id. Nor is the homestead
devisable. FLA. STAT. § 732.4015(1) (West 2010). The homestead cannot be devised if
the person is survived by a spouse or a minor child or children, except if there are no
minor children it may be devised to the spouse. Id. In every other case, the surviving
spouse has a life estate in the homestead real property with a vested remainder in the
decedent’s descendants per stirpes or, at the surviving spouse’s election within six
months of the decedent’s death, an undivided one-half interest as tenant-in-common
with the decedent’s descendants. FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (West 2012).
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relied instead on the marital presumption (which Florida probably
would not recognize). If the house is distributed to the mother under
Florida’s intestacy laws before the Obergefell decision, the court may
be able to claw-back the property after the decision because the mother
is not a bona fide purchaser. (At times, persons who receive
distributions from estates have to return them.) If the mother (or the
estate) subsequently sold the home to a bona fide purchaser, the
problems presented by Florida homestead may be similarly simple to
solve. Simply put, the bona fide purchaser of the homestead should be
protected.
Of course, the circumstances of the sale will probably be closely
examined in any litigation to see if the purchaser is a good faith
purchaser. For instance, one can easily imagine that some sales, even
for full consideration, might be questioned if they occurred on the eve
of the Obergefell decision or even on the eve of the legalization of
same-sex marriage in Florida. Of course, based on the state cases
following Trimble, property that passes in intestacy (including Florida
homestead) may be subject to claims by Louise if the estate is still
“open.”365 These transferred homestead issues could also include cases
where no formal administration was ever had, and perhaps situations
where the other heirs did not rely on existing law but somehow simply
passively accepted the property. After Obergefell, J.D. may be deemed
to be the child of Louise by the marital presumption. If J.D. was
deemed to be a child of Louise, the home would have passed to J.D.
but still would not pass to Louise. As the edits to our example show,
determining homestead rights post-Obergefell is a fact-intensive
process. While the example highlights broad generalizations of
retroactively granting homestead rights, it would be impossible to
determine how courts may generally return or deny the homestead
rights of surviving, previously unrecognized same-sex spouses.
b. Community Property
Community property states have similar issues. Community
property laws are given different operational effect in life than they are
in death. In community property states, any property generated during
marriage is considered community property and is subject to an equal
division between the married spouses.366 The retroactive application of
Obergefell presents many questions in the context of community
property. For example, when did the same-sex married couples begin to
accumulate community property in a non-recognition community
365.
See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
366.
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 766.31 (2015); see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,
supra note 10, at 512.
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property state? What is the current status of property that has been sold
or conveyed when that property would have been considered
community property had the marriage been recognized? It seems highly
likely that a route similar to the homestead example is the path to
resolving community property claims in this context. Tracing is the
ultimate solution and will allow the now-recognized spouse to vindicate
the rights afforded by marriage starting at the time the marriage was
validly celebrated. Accordingly, the bona fide purchaser should keep
possession of the property, while the proceeds of sale should be deemed
community property and traced in the hands of the spouse or estate who
disposed of the property. The proceeds of the sale of what should have
been community property had the marriage been recognized at the time
the property was acquired will remain community property and will
have to be traced. However, that is a common occurrence in a
community property system and will therefore not be a significant
burden on any state.
c. Tenancies-by-the-Entirety
There are a number of factors that are implicated in states that
have tenancy-by-the-entirety presumption—both lifetime and estate
issues. 367 For instance, the presumption of a tenancy-by-the entirety
directs how the property is transferred at the death of the first spouse.
Lifetime issues include creditor issues against one of the spouses.
Whether property is held as tenancy-by-the-entirety is pertinent to the
creditors of one of the spouses because creditors’ rights in tenancies-bythe-entirety property are usually limited, if not completely eliminated.
Let’s say in our example, Louise and Thelma move to Florida and
Thelma purchases their home in 2014, prior to the Obergefell decision.
Under Florida law, if they were an opposite-sex couple the home would
have been presumed to be held as a tenancy-by-the-entirety. 368 As a
same-sex couple, however, Louise and Thelma were deemed to be joint
tenants with rights of survivorship. 369 Later in 2014, let’s further
assume that Thelma is sued by a third party, loses the lawsuit, and a
judgment is rendered against her. Thelma does not have enough assets
in her own name to satisfy the judgment. Accordingly, a third party
tries to attach the home as part of the judgment, thus trying to force a
severance of the property. Thelma dies in early 2015, and a few months
367.
See, e.g., NEW YORK ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-2.2
(McKinney 2016) (stating that a conveyance to “persons not legally married to one
another but who are described . . . as husband and wife creates a joint tenancy [with
right of survivorship], unless expressly stated to be a tenancy in common”); see also
FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (West 2016).
368.
FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (West 2016).
369.
See id.
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later Obergefell is decided. If Florida’s prohibition on recognizing
same-sex couples from other states “never existed,” the house should
be deemed to be a tenancy-by-the-entirety and the judgment could not
be attached to the house. If the judgment has not been enforced, the
house should be protected. If the judgment has been enforced, does
Louise have any remedy? Could Louise try to reclaim the property or
the proceeds of the property? Would Louise have any action against
title insurers? It is unclear. Whether the attempted levy on the property
came before or after state law recognition of the marriage is probably
significant. Real estate and recorded titles, however, may be important
as well.
d. Potential Solution
The issues concerning “open” and “closed” estates, homestead,
community property, and tenancy-by-the-entirety rights may be
resolved by a state passing a statute of repose. Following Trimble,
Mississippi adopted a statute granting non-marital children three years
to bring claims against their fathers’ estates.370 In essence, this statute
of repose gave those whose interests were affected by a change in the
law a limited, but satisfactory, amount of time to bring claims related to
events that occurred before the change of law was announced.371 Giving
surviving same-sex spouses an adequate fixed period of time to
adjudicate any claims after the date of Obergefell would probably be
fair to everyone involved, especially because the time period between
the first valid same-sex marriages in the United States and the date of
Obergefell is not long. In order to avoid due process issues, though, the
statute of repose would have to be crafted to give the unrecognized
same-sex spouses enough time to respond and provide some type of
notice requirement. Of course, statutes like this may be too
controversial in formally non-recognition states to pass. If passed, there
could still be protracted litigation challenging the constitutionality of
these statutes considering the potential losses incurred by same-sex
surviving spouses. In the absence of such legislation, litigation will
continue, but with less certainty in the outcomes.
C. Retroactive Application of Obergefell to Current Cases
The Obergefell decision had an immediate litigious effect. To date,
recent cases have largely concerned retroactive death certificates,
wrongful death actions, and retroactive common law marriage. It
should be noted that these cases will implicate life insurance, social
370.
371.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15.
Id.
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security, pensions, employee benefits, inheritance, and wrongful death
judgments, among many other benefits and rights.
For example, De Leon v. Abbot372 was filed prior to Obergefell and
asked whether it was unconstitutional for Texas law to prohibit samesex marriages and prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriages from
other states. 373 The plaintiffs received a favorable ruling, and the
district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from
enforcing those laws. 374 The state appealed and the court stayed the
injunction. 375 Obergefell was decided while the appeal was under
submission, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s ruling in accordance with Obergefell.376 After failed attempts to
alter his spouse’s death certificate to include his name as surviving
spouse, John Stone-Hoskins intervened in De Leon to enforce the
injunction and have his late husband’s death certificate amended.377 In
response to a court order granting Stone-Hoskin’s motion, 378 Texas
Attorney General Ken Paxton and Governor Greg Abbott (Defendants)
filed motions for reconsideration of the order and to quash the motion
for contempt. 379 Defendants argued that the De Leon court’s order
allowing the injunction was improper because “Stone-Hoskins seeks to
raise a wholly separate claim based upon a legal question not at issue in
DeLeon: whether the Vital Statistics Unit must go back to amend death
certificates pre-dating the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision and the
implementing order.”380
Stone-Hoskins’ replied in a motion that likened the facts in
Obergefell to the case at hand.381 The De Leon court upheld the order in

372.
791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015).
373.
Id. at 624.
374.
Id. at 625.
375.
Id.
376.
Id. at 624–25.
377.
John Allen Stone-Hoskins' Emergency Motion to Intervene and for
Contempt, De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 5:13-cv982-OLG), 2015 WL 5905859.
378.
Robert Wilonsky, Ken Paxton Could Be Held in Contempt for Refusing to
Grant Same-Sex Death Certificate, DALLAS NEWS: THE SCOOP BLOG (Aug. 5, 2015,
11:59
AM),
http://thescoopblog.dallasnews.com/2015/08/till-death-do-them-partexcept-in-texas-where-dying-man-sues-for-same-sex-death-certificate.html/
[https://perma.cc/7GEE-QPRF].
379.
John Allen Stone-Hoskins' Emergency Motion, supra note 377.
380.
State Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Dated August
5, 2015 at 3, De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 5:13-cv982-OLG), 2015 WL 5905841.
381.
John Allen Stone-Hoskins' Response to State Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration and Emergency Motion to Rescind or Quash, De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.
Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 5:13-cv-982-OLG), 2015 WL 5905814.
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favor of Stone-Hoskins,382 allowing him to be recognized as survivingspouse and heir.383
In another example, an Alabama court recently applied Obergefell
retroactively to allow a surviving same-sex spouse to obtain the
proceeds of a wrongful death action. In Hard v. Bentley,384 the plaintiff
sought the proceeds of a wrongful death action through the laws of
intestate succession as a surviving spouse. 385 The plaintiff’s lawful
same-sex spouse was killed in a car crash in 2011, four years before the
Obergefell decision. 386 The court applied Obergefell retroactively and
effectively ruled that the plaintiff could receive spousal rights from the
estate.387 The plaintiff’s mother-in-law intervened as a defendant, and
argued that the plaintiff was not a surviving spouse entitled to proceeds
because Obergefell did not apply retroactively. 388 In this case, Pat
Fancher, the decedent’s mother, appealed the decision to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.389 Defendant argued that Obergefell cannot be
applied retroactively and that Alabama law should apply to prevent the
plaintiff from taking a share intestate.390 Defendant further pointed out
that the Court’s opinion did not mention whether Obergefell had any
sort of retroactive effect.391 Fancher contended that it was more likely
that the Court intended Obergefell to be applied prospectively, arguing
in part that:
Obergefell cannot take retroactive effect because two cases,
United States v. Windsor and Alabama Policy Institute v.
King, stand in the way of retroactively reaching the events of
2011 which created this case. Moreover, even if the
Obergefell opinion were given retroactive as to some aspects
of a marriage, Social Security benefits, insurance, etc., under
382.
Wilonsky, supra note 378.
383.
De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632. See Jake Whittenberg, Gay Military
Widower Claims Victory After Landmark Decision, KING 5 NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015, 7:53
AM),
http://www.king5.com/story/news/local/2015/11/04/gay-widower-victory-vabenefit/75147680/ [https://perma.cc/FFP2-TQ2J] (In Washington State, the state issued
an amended death certificate listing a man who passed away in 2008 as married).
384.
No. 2:13 CV-922-WKW-SRW (M.D. Ala. 2013).
385.
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–3, Hard v.
Bentley, No. 2:13 CV-922-WKW-SRW (M.D. Ala. 2013).
386.
Id. at 1.
387.
See Intervening Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and
Her Renewed Prayer for Relief at 10, Hard v. Bentley, No. 2:13-CV-922-WKW-SRW
(M.D. Ala. 2015).
388.
Id. at 3–4.
389.
See Principal Brief of Appellant Patricia Fancher, Hard v. Fancher, 648
F. App’x 853 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-13836).
390.
Id.
391.
Id. at 14–17.
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well-established legal principles in Alabama it cannot have
retroactive effect as it relates to the subject matter of this
dispute- wrongful death proceeds- because the Alabama
Supreme Court has strictly held that those awards vest
according to the laws in effect at the time of one’s death, with
no regard for whether or not the taker deserves the award,
and with no regard given to the decedent’s possible desires.392

The court denied Fancher’s motion in full and stood by its decision
to apply Obergefell retroactively. 393 Hard v. Bentley makes a bold
statement about the retroactive application of Obergefell, but only time
will tell if states follow this court’s lead in recognizing the marital
rights of same-sex couples and retroactively enforcing them following
Obergefell.
A few high profile Florida cases have redefined the state’s
historically anti-gay jurisprudence. The recent Florida case of Doussett
v. Florida Atlantic University394 applied Obergefell to recognize a samesex marriage for in-state tuition purposes. 395 In Doussett, Florida
Atlantic University (FAU) refused to recognize the student plaintiff’s
same-sex marriage and denied him in-state tuition.396 The plaintiff sued
FAU and challenged a Florida statute that banned state agencies from
recognizing same-sex marriages. 397 The Fourth District Court of
Appeals held that Obergefell mandated recognition of the plaintiff’s
same sex marriage.398 However, it is unclear whether the court intended
the remedy to apply retroactively or proactively. Regardless, what can
be seen here is a growing trend towards same-sex friendly
jurisprudence, even in states that have traditionally been against the
recognition of same-sex marriages.
The continued influx of cases relating to same-sex marriage are
forcing courts to consider whether they should retroactively recognize
same-sex common law marriages in the wake of Obergefell. One such
case, In re Underwood,399 occurred in Bucks County, Pennsylvania.400
In Underwood, the court recognized the common-law marriage of two
women as valid when one of the women passed away in 2013 prior to
392.
Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).
393.
Hard v. Attorney Gen., Ala., 648 Fed. App’x 853, 855 (11th Cir. 2016).
394.
184 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
395.
Id.
396.
Initial Brief of Appellant Gildas Dousset at 5–6, Dousset v. Fla. Atl.
Uinv., 184 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (No. 4D14-480).
397.
Id. at 6–7.
398.
Dousset, 184 So. 3d 1133.
399.
No. 2014-E0681-29, 2015 WL 5052382 (Pa. C.P. Orphans’ Ct. July 29,
2015).
400.
Id.
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Pennsylvania’s recognition of same-sex marriages. 401 The decedent,
Underwood, and her female spouse had held a religious ceremony,
combined their wills, and named each other as beneficiaries. 402 The
case arose when Underwood’s surviving spouse “sued United of
Omaha, which had refused to pay her a spousal beneficiary payment,
and Dearborn National Insurance Co., which had denied her a
survivor’s benefit on disability payments Underwood had received.”403
According to the court, Underwood and her spouse “entered into a
valid and enforceable marriage, under Pennsylvania common law” that
remained in effect until Underwood’s passing. 404 “Their marriage is
valid and enforceable,” the court ruled, “and they are entitled to all
rights and privileged of validly licensed married spouses in all respects
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”405
Similarly, in In re Estate of Stella Marie Powell, 406 a Texas
Probate Judge decided an inheritance dispute between Stella Powell’s
siblings and her same-sex domestic partner. 407 In 2008, Stella Powell
and Sonemaly Phrasavath celebrated their marriage in Texas.408 Stella
Powell passed away six years later in 2014. 409 After failing to settle
with Phrasavath, Stella’s three siblings filed suit and claimed heirship
over Phrasavath. 410 Phrasavath responded with a countersuit for
heirship and challenged Texas laws that banned the recognition of her
marriage with Stella.411
The decedent’s sibling’s argued that Phrasavath could not inherit
because her common-law marriage was not valid under Texas law and
she was free to legally marry anyone else. 412 The siblings contended
401.
Id.
402.
Zach Ford, Same-Sex Couples Are Securing Retroactive Recognition of
Their Marriages, THINK PROGRESS (July 30, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/same-sexcouples-are-securing-retroactive-recognition-of-their-marriages2270677a18f1#.nr3ygt4wd [https://perma.cc/WZ5Q-VV4V].
403.
Id.
404.
Underwood, 2015 WL 5052382.
405.
Id.
406.
No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cnty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Nov. 6, 2014).
407.
Id.
408.
Sonemaly Phrasavath’s Response to Special Exceptions and Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Continuance at 2, In re Estate of Stella Marie Powell, No. C-1PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Nov. 6, 2014).
409.
Id. at 1.
410.
Application for Determination of Heirship and Issuance of Letters of
Independent Administration at 1, In re Estate of Stella Marie Powell, No. C-1-PB-14001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Nov. 6, 2014).
411.
See Sonemaly Phrasavath’s Response to Special Exceptions and Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Continuance, supra note 408.
412.
See Applicants James Powell and Alice Huseman’s Special Exceptions to,
and Motion to Dismiss, Sonemaly Phrasavath’s (1) Contest to Applicants’ Application
for Determination of Heirship and Issuance of Letters of Independent Administration
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that the couple could not establish the requirement for common law
marriage, despite the fact that they held themselves out as being
married because “[a] couple cannot have a reputation in the community
as being married when, at that time, that public status is not legally
available to them or acknowledged.” 413 The siblings also argued that
allowing a common law marriage would undermine the decedent’s
intent because “retroactively recognized common law marriage which
was legally impossible while the decedent was alive does not look to the
decedent’s intent.”414 Thus, they argued that to retroactively recognize
the same-sex marriage would amount to overriding the intent of the
decedent.415 In support of recognizing her marriage, Pharasavath argued
that her relationship should qualify because it met all of the standards of
a common law marriage.416 Parasavath argued that she and the decedent
had an intimate relationship, joint financial status, both signed
declaration of domestic partnership in 2008, and represented to others
that they were married.417
After considering all of the facts at hand, on February 17th, 2015,
the Probate Judge denied the siblings’ attempt to block Parasavath as an
heir. 418 The state of Texas petitioned for a Writ of Mandamus to
challenge the Probate Judge’s order as an abuse of discretion. 419 The
State of Texas argued that the Probate Judge’s decision was overly
broad and violated the laws of Texas. 420 However, the Obergefell
decision was decided soon after the State of Texas appealed. After the
Supreme Court decided Obergefell, the Powell court approved a
settlement between the parties that recognized Phrasavath as Powell’s
spouse and effectively granted her rights as an intestate heir. 421
and (2) Counterapplication to Determine Heirship, for Appointment of Dependent
Administrator and Issuance of Letters of Administration, In re Estate of Stella Marie
Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Oct. 15, 2014).
413.
James Powell and Alice Huseman’s No Evidence Motion and Motion on
the Pleadings for Summary Judgment at 6, In re Estate of Stella Marie Powell, No. C1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Aug. 25, 2015).
414.
Id. at 15.
415.
Id. at 16.
416.
See Sonemaly Phrasavath’s Response to Special Exceptions and Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Continuance, supra note 408.
417.
Id. at 2.
418.
See Order on Special Exceptions and Motion to Dismiss, In re Estate of
Stella Marie Powell, Case No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Feb.
17, 2015).
419.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 4–6, In re State of Tex., Relator, No.
15-0135 (Tex. Feb. 17, 2015).
420.
Id. at 6, 9.
421.
See Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement, In re Estate of Stella
Marie Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Sept. 11, 2015);
see also Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement, In re Estate of Stella
Marie Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Sept. 17, 2015).
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In 2015, a Washington, D.C. court was asked to retroactively
recognize a common law same-sex marriage. 422 In this case, the
plaintiff and his same-sex partner were not legally married when the
partner passed away. 423 The plaintiff claimed that a common law
marriage existed between him and the decedent, therefore the court
should retroactively recognize the common law marriage and grant him
spousal rights in estate.424 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, but
the court denied the motion.425 Even though the case settled out of court
soon after,426 the fact that the court denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss is a telling sign that state courts are beginning to see merit in
these types of claims. Although the court here did not directly rely on
Obergefell as a precedent, such rulings are indicative of a shift in state
court jurisprudence regarding same-sex marriage following
Obergefell.427
D. The Beginning of a New Trend in Same-Sex Marriage Retroactivity?
A similar issue that is becoming apparent in the wake of Obergefell
is whether courts can retroactively “create” a marriage. Courts may
find themselves tasked with determining whether they can, or should,
retroactively declare a couple married to insure their entitlement to the
benefits of marriage, when the couple was never legally married at the
critical time period, and common law marriage was not recognized in

422.
See Lou Chibbaro Jr., Gay Man in Estate Dispute with Partner’s Family,
WASHINGTON
BLADE
(June
25,
2015,
1:11
PM),
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/06/25/gay-man-in-estate-dispute-with-partnersfamily/ [https://perma.cc/ETL3-NE9T]; Lou Chibbaro Jr., Motion to Dismiss Gay
Common Law Marriage Denied, WASHINGTON BLADE (Aug. 28, 2015, 3:46 PM),
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/08/28/motion-to-dismiss-gay-common-lawmarriage-case-denied/ [https://perma.cc/JU7G-H9CK].
423.
See Chibbaro Jr., Gay Man in Estate Dispute, supra note 422.
424.
Id.; Chibbaro Jr., Motion to Dismiss Gay Common Law Marriage
Denied, supra note 422.
425.
Chibbaro Jr., Motion to Dismiss Gay Common Law Marriage Denied,
supra note 422.
426.
Lou Chibbaro Jr., Settlement in D.C. Common Law Marriage Case,
WASHINGTON
BLADE
(Dec.
1,
2015,
11:00
AM),
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/12/01/settlement-in-d-c-common-law-marriagecase/ [https://perma.cc/DC8Y-AKBB].
427.
There are other examples of same-sex “marriage” being applied
retroactively. For example, see Troy Masters, United States Government Says L.A.
Couple’s
1975
Marriage
is
Valid,
PRIDELA
(June
7,
2016),
https://thepridela.com/2016/06/united-states-government-says-gay-couples-1975marriage-is-valid/ [https://perma.cc/6VR3-ZFAP]. For another interesting retroactive
judicial decision concerning the sweeping changes brought about by the Obergefell
decision, see Henderson v. Adams, No. 1:15-cv-00220-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 3548645
(S.D. Ind. June 30, 2016).
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the couple’s state of residence. Such a dilemma arises in cases where a
same-sex couple would have married had it been legal, and later sought
benefits of marriage only to be denied treatment as a married couple.
Mueller v. Tepler428 is perhaps the most compelling and relevant
case regarding the issue of same-sex marriage and access to benefits.429
In Mueller, Plaintiffs Margaret Mueller and Charlotte Stacey brought a
medical malpractice action against defendants Iris Wertheim and Iris
Wertheim, M.D., LLC, seeking damages for personal injuries that
Mueller suffered as a result of defendants’ negligence, and for Stacey’s
resulting loss of consortium. 430 Mueller spent several years under
Wertheim’s care after Wertheim mistakenly diagnosed her with the
wrong type of cancer in 2001.431 By the time the error was discovered
in 2005, Mueller’s cancer had progressed to a stage where some of the
tumors could no longer be surgically removed.432 Mueller commenced
her action against Wertheim in 2006, and filed a third amended
complaint twenty-three months later alleging, in relevant part, that
defendants were also liable to Stacey for loss of consortium.433
The complication in the case was that Mueller and Stacey,
although they had been domestic partners and resided together since
1985, were not married or joined in a civil union at the time
Wertheim’s error was made.434 In fact, it wasn’t until November 2005
that Mueller and Stacey were joined in a civil union under Connecticut
law.435 Based on these facts, the trial court granted defendants’ motion
to strike Stacey’s loss of consortium claims on the grounds that “a
consortium claim is not sustainable by people who are not either in a
legal marriage or in a legal civil union at the time of the wrong.”436
By the time plaintiffs filed their main brief in the appellate court,
the Supreme Court of Connecticut decided that Connecticut’s state
marriage laws were unconstitutional to the extent that they barred samesex couples from marrying in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public
Health. 437 In light of this decision, the plaintiffs’ contention was that
same-sex spouses who would have been married had same-sex marriage
been legal should be permitted to claim loss of consortium “when the
sole reason that they were not legally married at the time of the
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
2011)).
437.

95 A.3d 1011 (Conn. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1015.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1015–16.
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1016 (citing Mueller v. Tepler, 33 A.3d 814, 816 (Conn. App. Ct.
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
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underlying tortious conduct was a now repudiated public policy against
legal recognition of lifelong same-sex relationships.” 438 The appellate
court, however, affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the
plaintiffs’ situation was no different than that of an opposite-sex couple
who were not married at the time that the underlying tort occurred, and
thus a cause of action for loss of consortium was not available.439
The case made its way to the Supreme Court of Connecticut,
where it was reversed.440 The court held that the “intangible elements”
of the relationship of a same-sex couple who would have been married
when the underlying tort occurred, had such a union been legal, are the
same “intangible elements” of a relationship in marriage. 441
Additionally, the court noted that where marriage is not an option, it
cannot logically serve as a proxy for the existence of the commitment
that “gives rise to the existence of consortium . . . in the first instance .
. . .”442 Perhaps most importantly, the court concluded that:
[I]f a member of a same sex couple can prove that the couple
would have been married when the underlying tort occurred
if not for the fact that they were barred from doing so, it
would be illogical and unfair to characterize a marriage after
the tort occurred as a marriage to “a cause of action” . . .
instead of the formalization of a relationship that already had
given rise to “the existence of consortium” . . . and already
had all of the hallmarks of a marriage.443
Ultimately, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the commonlaw claim for loss of consortium should be expanded “to couples who
were not married when the tortious act occurred, but who would have
been married if the marriage had not been barred by state law.”444
Similarly, in Conover v. Conover, 445 the Maryland Court of
Appeals recently reversed the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’
refusal to give any weight to the argument that the court should
consider that a couple could not legally marry at the time of the events
causing the dispute. 446 Conover involved a child custody dispute
between Michelle and Brittany Conover, who were in the midst of a
438.
Mueller, 95 A.3d at 1018.
439.
Id. at 1016.
440.
Id. at 1014.
441.
Id. at 1025–26.
442.
Id. at 1026.
443.
Id. (citations omitted).
444.
Id. at 1023.
445.
120 A.3d 874 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).
446.
Conover v. Conover, No. 79, Sept. Term, 2015, 2016 WL 3633062 (Md.
Ct. App. 2016 July 7, 2016).
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divorce following their 2010 marriage and subsequent separation. 447
Before the parties were wed, they discussed having a child together,
and agreed that Brittany would be artificially inseminated from an
anonymous donor.448 In 2009, the child was conceived.449 In March of
2010, the District of Columbia, where the couple resided at the time,
began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 450 That April,
Brittany gave birth to a son.451 The birth certificate listed Brittany as the
mother, but identified no one as the father. 452 Brittany and Michelle
were married in the District of Columbia on September 28, 2010.453
The couple separated one year later in September 2011.454 Brittany
filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce in June of 2013, which did not
mention the child. 455 The custody dispute arose when Michelle
subsequently filed both an answer and a Counter-Complaint for
Absolute Divorce, in which she requested visitation rights with respect
to the child.456 The circuit court issued an opinion in June of 2013, in
which the court found that Michelle was not the child’s “father” and
therefore could not establish parental standing.457 The court noted that a
child born during the marriage was presumed to be the child of both
parties, but concluded that this presumption was not applicable in this
case because the child was conceived and born before the marriage.458
No credence was given to the argument that the parents could not be
legally married in Washington, D.C. at the time of conception, but the
court did note that the couple could have married before the child’s
birth, as Washington, D.C. began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples one month before the child was born. 459 The trial court held
that in order for Michelle to overcome the biological mother’s
constitutionally protected interest in the care, custody, and control of
her child, she would have to show that Brittany was unfit or that there
existed exceptional circumstances since the court viewed Michelle as a
“third party.”460 The court concluded that Michelle “is in fact a female,
had not adopted the child, and in no way was related to the child, thus
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Conover, 120 A.3d at 876–77.
Id.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 878–79.
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not sufficiently establishing that she could be the ‘father’ of the
child.”461
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of
the circuit court, holding that Michelle did not have parental standing to
challenge the denial of visitation or custody of the child. 462 Several
factors played into the court’s decision. First, the court dispelled with
Michelle’s argument that she was “denied” the benefit of the
presumption that a child born or conceived during a marriage is the
legitimate child of both spouses, because there was no evidence as to
why the couple chose 2009 for the conception of the child.463 Second,
although the change in Washington, D.C.’s marriage law did not take
effect until March 2010, at least three states (Connecticut, Iowa, and
Massachusetts) permitted same-sex marriage in 2009, and the couple
could have married before the birth of the child, but chose not to.464
Finally, the court rejected Michelle’s argument that she relied on
Brittany’s representations that Michelle was a parent to the child,
because Michelle had several years to pursue the adoption of the child
and formalize the parental relationship.465
While the court noted that the case was a sad one, it concluded that
Maryland law left them no choice, and that the question was better
considered by the state legislature than by the courts.466 Ultimately, the
deciding factor may have been that the couple waited until after the
child’s birth to consummate their marriage. 467 Had the couple been
married before the child’s conception or birth, the case likely would
have been decided differently.468
The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, reversed the Court of
Special Appeals’ decision. The court held that de facto parents have
standing to contest custody or visitation and need not show parental
unfitness or exceptional circumstances before a trial court can apply a
best interests of the child analysis.469
A unanimous appellate court in New York held similarly in In re
Estate of Leyton. 470 In Leyton, the issue of retroactivity arose when
relatives of the decedent sought to revoke a will that decedent executed

461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Id. at 879.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 883.
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 883.
Id.
Id. at 886.
In re Estate of Leyton, 135 A.D. 3d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
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in 2001.471 The will named the decedent’s same-sex partner as executor
of the estate and granted him significant bequests.472 In 2002, the couple
had a commitment ceremony in New York, which at the time was
without legal effect because same-sex marriage did not exist in New
York until the 2011 enactment of the Marriage Equality Act. 473 The
couple later separated in 2010 and the decedent died in 2013 without
executing a new will. 474 The decedent’s relatives sought to have the
former partner disqualified as executor and the bequests to him revoked
on the theory that the former partner should be treated as a former
spouse whose nomination as executor and gifts under the will are
revoked by statute upon “divorce” or legal separation. 475 The
Surrogate’s Court of New York County ordered, and the appellate
court later affirmed, that “according the union between decedent and
[his partner] retroactive legal effect would be inconsistent with their
understanding that they had never been legally married.”476
The appellate court even went so far as to declare that the
“Supreme Court’s recognition of same-sex couples’ fundamental right
to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges does not compel a retroactive
declaration that the commitment ceremony entered into by decedent and
[his partner] in 2002, when same-sex marriage was not recognized
under New York law, was a legally valid marriage.”477
Issues similar to these are appearing frequently in a variety of
practice areas.478

471.
In re Estate of Leyton, No. 2013-4842, 2015 WL 3882524, at *1 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. June 16, 2015).
472.
Id.
473.
Id.
474.
In re Estate of Leyton, 2015 WL 3882524, at *1.
475.
Id.
476.
In re Estate of Leyton, 135 A.D.3d 418, 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
477.
Id.
478.
See, e.g., In re Villaverde, 540 B.R. 431 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015)
(holding that a same-sex couple who entered civil union but did not marry cannot file
joint petition in bankruptcy); Celec v. Edinboro Univ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 651 (W.D. Pa.
2015) (surviving same-sex partner denied life insurance benefits); Bone v. St. Charles
Cty. Ambulance Dist., No. 4:15CV912 RLW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123207 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 16, 2015) (spouse denied health insurance benefits before Obergefell); Marie
v. Mosier, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (D. Kan. 2015) (tax filings by same-sex couples must
be permitted); Taylor v. Brasuell, No. 1:14-CV-00273-REB, 2015 WL 4139470 (D.
Idaho July 9, 2015) (holding that a same-sex spouse would be permitted to be buried
with her deceased spouse in veterans’ cemetery where previous permission had been
denied). Courts have even gone so far as to look back to the original date of cohabitation when determining an equitable distribution formula upon divorce of a samesex couple who were denied marriage by the laws of their estate. See In the Matter of
Munson & Coralee Beal, No. 2015-0253, 2016 WL 4411308 (N.H. Aug. 19, 2016).
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CONCLUSION
The implications of Obergefell concerning the unconstitutionality
of state laws that prohibited the recognition of otherwise valid same-sex
marriages from sister states has been largely ignored. Yet, the potential
application of the Court’s holding to choice-of-law matters and to
remedial considerations concerning previously unrecognized same-sex
spouses will have substantive financial effects across the entire
spectrum of legal fields—for, with marriage, comes wide-ranging rights
and obligations. Moreover, the practical relevance of many of these
marital rights and obligations are inescapably intertwined with the
length of the marriage. Though far reaching, the decision will
predominately impact the realm of state property laws.
Unfortunately—and perhaps intentionally—the Obergefell decision
provided no guidance on its retroactive application. In an effort to fill
that jurisprudential chasm, this Article articulates and defends a rich
positive and normative jurisprudential framework through which courts
and legislatures might analyze the rapidly growing number of real
property and property succession disputes that continue to be initiated
in the wake of the Obergefell decision. In the end, this Article
concludes that, on balance, Obergefell should be applied purely
retroactively as to both choice-of-law matters and remedial
considerations, to the extent that adequate remedies may be fashioned
to protect innocent third parties while rectifying the property
deprivations
of
unconstitutionally
unrecognized
marriages.
Accordingly, this Article provides a guiding source on the practical
implications that will stem from Obergefell’s retroactive application.

